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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the sources of the momentum abnormal returns. The first
essay attempts to find the relative role of cross-sectional and time-series variances in
generating returns from the momentum strategy. By decomposing the returns from the
momentum strategy both theoretically and empirically, the first essay finds that ownstock autocovariance is an important source in generating momentum returns. More
interestingly, the own-stock autocovariance comes primarily from the loser portfolio.
This finding provides another explanation to the recent finding that the loser portfolio is
the driving force of the momentum abnormal returns.
Based on the above discovery from the first essay, the second essay attempts to
find out the underlying reason for the important asymmetric own-stock autocovaraince
from the loser portfolio. We find that this return predictability comes from the shortselling constraints and risks. Stocks with more severe short-selling constraints prevent
pessimistic information from being released into the stock prices more quickly; and thus
causes those stocks to be overpriced and auto-correlated in their returns.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Abnormal returns generated from the momentum strategy have puzzled finance
researchers for more than twenty years. The underlying sources of abnormal returns from the
momentum strategy have provoked heated debate and rethinking about the widely-accepted
concept---efficient market hypothesis, which is central to finance. However, momentum
strategy---of all the market anomalies, most seriously challenged the efficient market hypothesis
even in the weak form.
This dissertation attempts to explain the abnormal returns from the momentum strategy
from two different aspects. The first essay develops a theoretical model to decompose the
returns generated from the momentum strategy. By utilizing the historical data, the first essay
supports the finding of Lehmann (1990) that autocorrelation of own stock returns is one of the
driving forces for the expected momentum returns. More importantly to the literature, the first
essay finds the own-autocovariance in the winner portfolio is almost negligible compared to that
of the loser portfolio. Thus, it provides another underlying reason to the recent finding that the
contribution of the winner and loser portfolios to the momentum returns is asymmetric.
Therefore, the market may not be as efficient as we previously believed. Furthermore, from the
return decomposition, we know the direct link that researchers typically put between the
positivity of the momentum abnormal returns and the market inefficiency may not obviously
hold. Based on the findings from the first essay, we further investigate the underlying reason
for the persistence of the own-stock autocovariance in the loser portfolio, which may lead to its
asymmetric contribution to the momentum abnormal returns. In the second essay, we find that
the short-selling constraints and risk cause the autocovariance in the loser stock returns, and
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explain the momentum abnormal returns from the loser portfolio strongly and independently.
Stocks which have most short-selling constraints generate the lowest returns. This return
prediction in the momentum strategy supports the mispricing explanation that stocks with more
severe short-selling constraints prevent pessimistic information from being released into the
stock price more quickly; and thus causes those stocks to be more overpriced and auto-correlated
in stock returns.
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CHAPTER II
UNDERSTANDING THE SOURCES OF ABNORMAL RETURNS FROM
THE MOMENTUM STRATEGY

Abstract
In this thesis, we study the sources of the returns from the momentum strategy and
attempt to find some hints for the heated debate on the market efficiency hypothesis that has
occurred over the past twenty years. By decomposing the momentum returns from a
mathematical model, we directly investigated the contributors and their relative importance in
generating these momentum returns.
Our empirical results indicated that the autocorrelation of own stock returns is one of the
driving forces for the expected momentum returns. The magnitude of the autocorrelation
decreased as the ranking period became more remote. The second important source came from
the cross-sectional variation of the expected returns in the winner and loser portfolios for a given
time. The third important source was the difference of the expected returns between the winner
and loser portfolios. To our surprise, the cross-autocovariance did not contribute significantly to
the expected momentum returns. Thus, the lead-lag effect can cause momentum returns, but its
impact is not as significant as we had anticipated.
More importantly, by changing the weights of the winner and loser portfolios, we found
that the own-autocovariance of the winner portfolio was virtually negligible, compared to that of
the loser portfolio. The returns of the winners were much more random than those of the losers.
This asymmetric own-autocovariance found in the return decomposition provided further support
for the recent finding that the contribution of the winner and loser portfolios to the momentum
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returns is asymmetric, and it is the losers, rather than the winners, that drive the momentum
returns.
Therefore, the market may not be as efficient as we previously believed.

I. Introduction
1.1. Background
In the 1970s the efficient market hypothesis was widely accepted among finance
researchers. It has been commonly believed that information spreads in the market very quickly,
and hence, the prices of securities can quickly reflect the information with minimal delay. Thus,
neither the technical analysis of past stock price behavior nor the fundamental analysis of firm
specific information can help investors beat the market and earn returns higher than those of
randomly selected portfolios with comparable risk. As stated by Malkiel (2003), in efficient
financial markets, no investor can earn above-average returns without accepting above-average
risks. This efficient market hypothesis has been engrained in much of the modern theoretical and
empirical research in financial economics.
However, two decades ago, researchers found that simple investment strategies based on
the past returns of stocks might realize consistently positive abnormal returns. These rejections
of the martingale behavior of stock prices have seriously challenged the foundation of even the
weakform of the efficient market hypothesis.
Stock return predictability based on past returns alone has attracted considerable attention
in finance. The literature has three documented stock trading strategies categorized in terms of
time horizons: (a) short-term reversal (Jegadeesh, 1990, Lo and MacKinlay, 1990); (b)
intermediate momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman (JT), 1993); and (c) long-term reversal (Debondt
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and Thaler, 1985, Fama and French, 1988). As evidence opposing the efficient market
hypothesis, these stock trading strategies are typical examples of exploiting stock return
predictability. The debate on the abnormal returns from the momentum strategy that sells the
“losers” and buys the “winners” over a 3 to 12 month horizon is much more diverse and
voluminous.
This paper focuses on momentum strategy, which—of all the strategies identified—most
seriously challenges the market efficiency hypothesis (Fama, 1998). Unlike either the short-term
contrarian strategy that provides too little time and requires too much cost for possible arbitrage
or the long-term contrarian strategy, that is not robust to risk adjustment (Fama and French,
1996) and is subject to measurement problems(Ball, Kothari and Shanken, 1995), the
intermediate-term momentum strategy shows strong persistence in both the U.S. and
international markets (Asness, Liew and Stevens, 1997, Rouwenhorst, 1998), and continues to
exist for post 1990 periods (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001). The persistence of the abnormal
momentum returns after the sample period of the original studies diminishes the possibility of
data snooping bias and positions it as a more serious anomaly than other well studied anomalies
such as “the small firm effect” and “the value/growth stock phenomenon, “both of which
disappear after the sample periods in the original studies (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001).
Many serious attempts have been made to explain the abnormal momentum returns from
various market phenomena. Proponents of rational explanations argue that the profitability of
momentum strategies is explained by bearing some sort of additional risks; and, therefore, the
market is at least weak-form efficient (Conrad and Kaul, 1998, Berk, Green and Naik, 1999,
Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002, and Lewellen, 2002). Proponents of behavioral explanations
argue that no risk factors can completely absorb the abnormal momentum returns; rather, it is the
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manner in which irrational investors interpret the information that causes the momentum or
pattern of stock returns (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993, 2001, Barberis, Shleiferand Vishny, 1998,
Daniel, Hirschleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998, and Hong and Stein, 1999). Therefore, the
abnormal returns from momentum strategies constitute strong evidence that the market is not
even weak-form efficient. The middle position between the above two schools of thought
focuses on market friction explanations. Proponents of market friction argue that parts or all of
the abnormal momentum returns are justified by some kind of transaction costs in the imperfect
market (Lesmond, Schilland Zhou, 2004, Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004, Sadka, 2006, and Ali and
Trombley, 2006). Nevertheless, the empirical results of the market friction explanations are
mixed with respect to market efficiency.

1.2. Motivation
In the literature, there are two ways to address the sources of the returns from the
momentum strategy. Some studies attempt to determine the sources of the momentum returns by
return decomposition. Expected return decomposition is important because we can determine
clearly and directly how the time-series and cross-sectional variations play in generating returns
from the momentum strategy. The other line of literature attempts to explain why the
aforementioned components can generate abnormal momentum returns. If the researchers
believe the cross-sectional variation is the cause of the momentum returns, then they are
proponents of the rational explanation. They attempt to discover risk factors that can fully
absorb the abnormal returns from the momentum strategy. On the contrary, if the researchers
believe the time-series variation is the cause to the momentum returns, then they are advocates of
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the behavioral finance explanation. As a result, they attempt to use psychological theories to
explain the autocorrelation of the stock returns from the momentum strategy.
This essay is an example of the first line of literature and attempts to decompose the
momentum returns and determine the major contributors to the momentum strategy. Unlike the
rational explanations that reject any possibility of stock return autocorrelation in generating
momentum returns or the behavioral explanations that attribute all the momentum returns to the
stock return patterns, we hypothesize that both own stock return autocovariances and crosssectional variances generate the returns from the momentum strategy. However, the focus is
determining which component is the main contributor. This thesis first decomposes the
momentum expected returns and then uses historical data to calculate the relative weight of each
component in the momentum returns.
Lehmann (1990) made the first attempt in literature to decompose the returns from the
contrarian strategy. The weight used in Lehmann (1990) is
∑

, where

. Built on Lehmann (1990), Lo and MacKinlay (1990) further advanced the
1, … , . All

return decomposition. They use the weight

the later studies follow Lo and MacKinlay (1990) return decomposition, including those by
Conrad and Kaul (1998) and Lewellen (2002).
Our return decomposition in this thesis is based on that of Lo and MacKinlay (1990).
However, unlike the previous studies that include all stocks in the return decomposition, our
weighting scheme only picks the top winners and bottom losers in the portfolio. Our model
reflects the most common momentum strategy that has been analyzed in the literature, in which
only a proportion of stocks ranked as winners or losers are weighted in the strategy. This type of
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strategy also takes better advantage of potential stock return patterns if any exist. Top winners
and bottom losers have more tendency to retain a more stable return pattern. Thus, only
including those stocks better reflects the beliefs of investors and avoids potential stock return
pattern noises from the intermediate portfolio stocks. Furthermore, this type of momentum
strategy reflects the stronger belief of investors in the stock return continuation thus could
generate additional abnormal returns and pose a greater challenge to the efficient market
hypothesis. More importantly, unlike the previous return decomposition that investigated the
component from the whole portfolio, our weighting scheme provides the possibility of further
investigating the components from the winner and loser portfolios separately. As the recent
literature indicates that the winners and losers are quite different in characteristics and that their
contributions to the abnormal momentum returns are asymmetric, our separate investigation of
the components in the winner and loser portfolios provides us an opportunity to discover the
potential cause of this recent finding in the literature. This is the first study to investigate the
components in the winner and loser portfolios in return decomposition.
Our empirical results indicate that both the own stock return autocovariances and crosssectional variances are the two major contributors to the momentum returns. However, the
cross-autocovariances do not play such an important role in explaining the momentum returns as
other studies have proposed.
More interestingly, although the own-autocovariances of the winner and loser portfolios
bear the same sign, their magnitudes are quite asymmetric. Compared to the winners, the losers
have much more stable return patterns and hence much larger own stock autocovariances from
the ranking period to the holding period. This provides additional support to the recent finding
that the losers, rather than the winners, are the driving force of the abnormal momentum returns.
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All of these results indicate that the market may not be as efficient as we previously
believed.

II. Literature Review
2.1. Stock Trading Strategies
Three stock trading strategies that utilize only the technical analysis and derive consistent
positive profits are short-term contrarian strategy, intermediate-term momentum strategy, and
long-term contrarian strategy. Of these three stock trading strategies, returns from the
momentum strategy are most robust and therefore are the focus of our study. These three stock
trading strategies all consist of a time line of three periods: formation period, holding period and
post-holding period. The strategies select stocks on the basis of returns over the past K periods
(formation period) and hold them for J periods (holding period).

2.1a Short-term Contrarian Strategy
The short-term contrarian strategy was first documented by Jegadeesh (1990) and
Lehmann (1990). It is the strategy that ranks the stocks in the past K periods, which is typically
a week or a month. Then construct the portfolio by buying the past worst performing stocks and
selling the past best performing stocks, and hold it for another J periods, which is also a week or
a month respectively.
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2.1b Intermediate Momentum Strategy
First documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the momentum strategy selects stocks
on the basis of returns over the past K periods (formation period) and holds them for J periods
(holding period). The typical length for J and K are three to twelve months. Some studies also
wait S periods between the formation and holding period to avoid microstructure effects. This is
denoted as the skip period. This paper, as many other studies, measures periods in months, so J,
K and S are in months. To simplify, all the momentum strategies in this paper will be described
as (K, S, J). To increase the testing power, the strategy includes overlapping holding periods.
Therefore, in any given month t, the strategy holds a series of portfolios that are selected in the
current month as well as in the previous K-1 months if there are no skip months.
In the formation period, the securities are ranked in descending order on the basis of their
geometric returns over this period. The long portfolio or the “winners” consists of equally
weighted top P percent securities. The short portfolio or the “losers” consists of equally
weighted bottom P percent securities. In much of the literature, P is 10 percent. Some studies
also use value weighted (measured by market capitalization) P percent securities.
This paper will focus on the (6,0,1) equally-weighted rolling strategy and the (6,0,6)
equally-weighted nonrolling strategy.

2.1c Long-term Contrarian Strategy
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) first documented profits from the long-term contrarian
strategy. Based on the stocks’ past three year performance, the portfolio selects the winners and
losers, and holds them for another three year period.
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Since the past losers continuously

outperform the past winners, this contrarian strategy of buying the past losers and selling the past
winners obtains positive raw returns consistently.

2.2. Literature Review
Voluminous researches try to identify the sources of abnormal returns from the
momentum strategy. There are two categories of studies in tackling this issue. The first category
of studies tries to discover the sources by decomposing the momentum returns into cross
sectional and time series variances. The second category of studies focuses on providing
different explanations for the cross-sectional or times-series variances in momentum abnormal
returns.

2.2a Return Decomposition
Lehmann (1990) has suggested market inefficiency due to stock price “overreaction”. He
constructed a contrarian strategy by buying the past k period losers and selling the past k period
winners on a weekly basis. However, this zero cost strategy earns positive profits due to the
phenomenon that the past winners tend to lose and past losers tend to win in the current period.
Lehmann attributes this stock price predictability to stock price “overreaction” in the previous
period. For a given set of N securities over a T time periods in the portfolio, at the beginning of
period t, buy

dollars of each security i. The weights are given by
∑

;
The profits for the portfolio in period
,

∑

,

.

are

= ∑

,
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so that the average profit over the T periods on this portfolio strategy is
∑

∑

,

∑

.

Algebraic manipulation of this expression yields
∑

∑

∑

∑

,

where
∑

∑

;

are the average returns of the equally weighted portfolio and of security i overtime, respectively.
Therefore, average portfolio profits over the T periods depend on the autocovariances of the
returns of an equally weighted portfolio, the autocovariances of the returns of the individual
securities, and the cross-sectional variation in the unconditional mean returns of the individual
securities.
Jegadeesh (1990) also presents empirical evidence of predictability of individual stock
returns on a monthly basis. He first tests serial correlation properties of individual security
returns by checking coefficient signs of the following regression:
∑

(1), where

is the mean monthly return of

security i in the sample period t+1 to t+60. This regression estimates show strong serial reversal
that the slope coefficients at lag one,
the coefficients of

and

is negative with a significant t-statistic of -18.58. While

are negative and demonstrate the return serial reversal in the

regression, the rest of the coefficients are positive and indicate return serial momentum.
Jegadeesh also examines the return serial correlation from the portfolio perspective. Three
different reading strategies are developed. S0 forecasts individual stock raw returns by using the
following model:

∑

, where
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’s are

estimated from a regression model similar to the regression model (1), with the raw return

as

the dependent variable over the period t-60 to t-1, and these estimates are updated every month.
Then ten portfolios are formed by descending ranking order of the predicted returns, and they are
updated every month too. S1 and S12 strategies also form ten portfolios on the basis of the onemonth and twelve-month lagged returns. Finally, the abnormal returns earned by the portfolios
formed in the above three strategies are estimated under the market model of
, where

and

are the portfolio return and the risk-free rate

respectively. The intercept is the abnormal return of the above strategies. The results of the three
strategies all demonstrate positive abnormal returns, which provide strong evidence of
predictable behavior of security returns.
Lo and Mackinlay (1990) construct a particular weekly contrarian strategy. It is to buy
stocks at time t that were losers at time t-k and to sell stocks at time t that were winners at time tk, where winning and losing is determined with respect to the equal-weighted return on the
market. Thus, the weight for security i at time t is,
1, … ,
∑

where
,

…

is the equal-weighted market index.

By construction,

is an arbitrage portfolio because the weights sum to zero. Since the

portfolio weights are proportional to the differences between the market index and the returns,
securities that deviate more positively from the market at time t-k will have greater negative
weight in the time t portfolio and vice versa. Such a strategy is designed to best take advantage
of stock market overreactions. The profit
∑

from such a strategy is

,

13

and take the expectation of the above equation,
∑

Γ
,

where

∙ denotes the trace operator, and is the identity vector with

proper dimension.
Therefore, the profit of the contrarian strategy is the summation of three terms: the first
term is the kth-order autocovariance of the equal-weighted market index. The second term is the
cross-sectional average of the kth-order autocovariances of the individual securities, and the last
term is the cross-sectional variance of the mean returns.
In order to separate the effects of cross-autocovariances versus own-autocovariances in
generating the expected returns from the contrarian strategy, the above expected return is further
rearranged as,
Γ

Γ

Γ
.

is cross-autocovariances of equal-weighted market index returns,

is the own-

autocovariances of individual stock returns. They found weekly portfolio returns from the
contrarian strategy are strongly positively cross-autocorrelated and over 50 percent of the
expected profits are attributable to these cross effects. They propose the lead-lag effect as the
cause of the strong positive cross-autocorrelation between different stocks in the portfolio. Leadlag effect occurs when a security’ return lags on a common factor. The security with less lags on
a common factor leads the security with more lags. Their empirical results show that returns of
large stocks almost always lead those of smaller stocks. Therefore, they argue that given
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individual security returns are generally weakly negatively autocorrelated, the positive contrarian
profits are completely attributable to cross-effects.
Conrad and Kaul (1998) attempt to determine the sources of the expected profits of the
entire class of trading strategies that are based on information contained in past returns of
individual securities. They utilize a single framework, which builds on the analyses in Lehmann
(1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990), to decompose the profits of all strategies, both contrarian
and momentum. The expected profit of the momentum strategy is
,

where

∑

∑

,

is the predictability-profitability index,

is the

unconditional mean of security i for the interval {t-1, t} of length k, and
∑

is the unconditional single-period mean return of the equal-weighted market

portfolio at time t.
Under the assumption of mean stationarity of individual security returns, the above
decomposition shows that total expected profits of trading strategies result from two distinct
sources: time-series predictability in asset returns, measured by P(k), and profits due to crosssectional dispersion in mean returns of securities, denoted by
i.e.

. The first term in P(k),

, is the average first-order autocovariance of the return on the equal-weighted market

portfolio, the second term, i.e.,

, is the average first-order autocovariances of the individual

securities in the portfolio. This arrangement of expected returns separates the returns from the
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time-series predictability entirely from the cross-sectional dispersion, no matter whether the
time-series predictability is from own or cross-autocovariances,
The empirical decomposition of the profits from the strategies suggests that the crosssectional variance of mean returns is both the predominant source of momentum strategy profits,
and a major source of losses to long-term contrarian strategy.
However, Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) argue that the Conrad and Kaul (1998) results
are subject to small sample biases in their tests and bootstrap experiments. Jegadeesh and
Titman’s empirical tests indicate that cross-sectional differences in expected returns explain very
little, if any, of the momentum profits. Conrad and Kaul use the average realized return of each
stock as their measure of the stock expected return. Specifically,

∑

,

, where

number of observations available for stock i. They use the cross-sectional variance of
estimator of

as the

. Jegadeesh and Titman argue that such design ignores the impact of the error in

the estimates of
Since

is the

on the estimate of

. Let

, where

is an unbiased estimator of expected returns,

represents estimation error.

0. However, since

the variance of the estimated expected returns overestimates the cross-sectional variance of true
expected returns. They argue that the magnitude of this overestimation is exacerbated when use
all stocks in the sample period as in Conrad and Kaul, for the calculation of expected returns,
regardless of the length of their return history.

2.2b Different Explanations
There are two conflicting schools of explanations for the sources of momentum abnormal
returns. The dominant group consists of the behavioral theories, which challenge the market
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efficiency hypothesis and the classical models of rational pricing. The other group includes the
rational theories, which argue that it is premature to reject the rational models and suggest that
the profitability of momentum strategies may be compensation for extra risk or macroeconomic
factors (Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)). The market friction explanation is the third group that
stands in the middle of the above two explanations.

2.2b (1) Behavioral Explanations
The explanations offered by the behavioral theories can be categorized as overreaction
and underreaction. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) introduce experimental psychology into the
study of finance. They argue that people tend to “overreact” to unexpected and dramatic news
events. If stock prices overshoot systematically, then they will have predictable reversals based
on the past return data only in the long term. This hypothesis suggests a violation of the weakform market efficiency. Delong et al. (1990) states that there are rational speculators and
liquidity or noise traders. Because the latter buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall, the
rational speculators would buy/sell ahead of the noise traders in the hope of selling/buy at a
higher/lower price later. But these purchases by rational speculators can make positive feedback
traders even more excited and so move prices even further away from fundamental values than
they would go in the absence of rational speculators.
More recently, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) develop a theory based on
investors’ overconfidence in their private information signal, rather than the public information
signal. This asymmetric confidence results from biased self-attribution of different investment
outcomes. Investors tend to attribute the performance of ex post winners to their stock selection
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skills and that of the ex post losers to bad luck. When an investor receives public confirmation,
his confidence rises. But disconfirming public information causes confidence to fall only
modestly, if at all. Thus, stock prices overreact to private information signals and underreact to
public signals. Even if an individual begins with unbiased beliefs, new public signals on average
are viewed as confirming the private signal. This suggests that public information can trigger
further overreaction to a preceding private signal. The continuing overreaction causes
momentum in security prices, but such momentum is eventually reversed as further public
information gradually draws the price back toward fundamentals. This is consistent with the
intermediate momentum and long-term reversal in stock returns.
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) both proposed
“underreaction”, though with a different working mechanism, to explain the intermediate
momentum and long-term reversal. BSV (1998) propose two psychological phenomena,
“conservatism” and “representativeness heuristic”, to construct a parsimonious model of investor
sentiment that at the same time, explains underreaction and overreaction as the causes for the
momentum and the long-term contrarian abnormal returns. Conservatism is defined as the slow
updating of models in the face of new evidence (Edwards, 1968). Representativeness heuristic is
a tendency of experimental subjects to view events as typical or representative of some specific
behavioral class when a series of such events happen recently. Therefore, investors tend to show
underreaction of stock prices to good news such as earnings announcements, but overreaction of
stock prices to consistent patterns of good or bad news. They argue that although conservatism
alone leads to underreaction and hence to intermediate momentum, the combination of
conservatism and representative heuristic can lead to long horizon negative returns for stocks
with consistently high returns in the past.
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HS (1999) does not apply any behavior biases on the part of investors, but they model a
market with two groups of boundedly rational agents: “newswatchers” and “momentum traders”.
They both act rationally in updating their expectations, but only conditional on their own
information sets, or the subset of the available public information. Each newswatcher observes
some private information, but ignores information in the past history of prices and failes to
extract other newswatchers’ information from prices. Therefore, assuming information diffuses
gradually across the population, information obtained by the informed newswatchers would be
transmitted with a delay and prices undrreact in the short run. This underreaction results in the
momentum profit that momentum traders can obtain by trend-chasing. The momentum traders
make judgments only by a limited history of prices and do not factor in fundamental information.
So the momentum traders tend to extrapolate based on past prices and push prices of past
winners above their fundamental values. In the long horizon, prices eventually revert to their
fundamentals. This causes long-term reversal.
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) test the gradual-information-diffusion model of HS (1999)
empirically. They found that firm-specific information, especially negative information, diffuses
only gradually among the investors. Their findings are: 1) excluding the very small stocks below
the 20th NYSE/AMEX percentile, the profitability of the momentum strategies declines sharply
with firm size; 2) holding size fixed, stocks with low analyst coverage generates more
momentum returns; 3) the effect of analyst coverage is asymmetric, i.e., it is greater for stocks
that are past losers than for past winners. They reason this asymmetry as, for low-coverage
stocks, when firms get good news; the managers probably have the incentive to push this good
news to the investing public as soon as possible. In contrast, when there is bad news, managers
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are likely to be less forthcoming, and combining with low outside analyst coverage, the stock
prices tend to be overpriced more.
In their paper, the analyst coverage is a proxy for the information diffusion speed. Thus,
they assume that stocks with lower analyst coverage should, all else being equal, be the ones
where firm-specific information diffuse slower across the investing public. However, analyst
coverage is strongly related to firm size, and the latter also captures a good portion of the
information diffusion effect. In order to investigate the unique role played by the analyst
coverage in the rate of information diffusion, they calculate residual analyst coverage, where the
residual comes from a regression of log (1+coverage) on log (firm size) and NASDAQ dummy.

2.2b (2) Rational Explanations
On the rational theories side, some financial economists have suggested that crosssectional variation in expected returns generates the momentum abnormal returns.
Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) develop a theoretical model where the cross-sectional
variation in risk and expected return generates profits in short-term reversal and intermediate
momentum. They construct a dynamic model that relates changes of a firm’s systematic risk
through time to firm-specific variables and hence the cross-sectional variation of expected return
to explain the abnormal returns from trading strategies. Firm-specific variables refer to book to
market ratio, size or past return, which are generally used to explain the cross-sectional variation
in expected returns.
Firms in the model have two kinds of assets: (a) in-place assets and (b) growth options.
The sum of these types of assets yields the expected returns of firms. In each period, cash flows

20

from in-place assets may die off, and new investment opportunities may emerge to the firm.
Because the composition and systematic risk of the firm’s assets are persistent, expected returns
in a given period are positively related to lagged expected returns (positive time series between
expected returns of different periods). However, the expected returns are negatively related to
lagged realized returns (negative cross-sectional variation of expected returns) because shocks to
the composition of the firm’s assets are negatively correlated with changes in systematic risk.
Therefore, these lead to momentum effects in the intermediate term and reversal in the short term.
At an aggregate level, the time series of portfolio expected returns show positive correlation with
book-to-market, which serves as the firm’s risk, relative to the scale of its asset base; however,
the excess returns are negatively related to interest rates.
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) show that profits from the momentum strategy can be
explained by a set of lagged macroeconomic variables that are related to the business cycle.
Payoffs to a six-month/six-month momentum strategy disappear once stock returns are adjusted
for their predictability based on these macroeconomic variables. Thus the results provide a
possible role for time-varying expected returns, predicted by standard macroeconomic variables,
as an explanation for the momentum abnormal returns. The macroeconomic variables used in
the study are dividend yield, default spread, yield on three-month T-bills, and term structure
spread. Their results suggest that the profitability of momentum payoffs comes from the crosssectional variation in conditional expected returns. These findings are consistent with the
arguments of Berk et al. (1999) that profitability of momentum strategies represents
compensation for bearing time-varying risk.
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2.2b (3) Market Friction Explanations
Most of above papers have not taken the huge transaction costs into consideration.
Neither do empirical studies include the transaction costs when testing the abnormal returns from
trading strategies. The work of Korajazyk and Sadka (2004) is one of the few papers that focus
on the transactions costs in momentum strategy. They find that momentum strategies remain
profitable even after considering market frictions. The price impact models imply that abnormal
returns to portfolio strategies decline with portfolio size. In particular, they estimate the size of a
momentum-based fund that could be achieved before abnormal returns are either statistically
insignificant or driven to zero. They find that the estimated excess returns of some momentum
strategies disappear after an initial investment of $4.5 to over $5.0 billion is engaged in such
strategies. However, additional costs involved in short sales are not fully captured by their
measure of price impact.

III. Decomposition of Momentum Returns
3.1. Theoretical Model
To elucidate the relative role of the cross-sectional and time-series effects in generating
momentum returns, we decompose the momentum expected returns first and then discuss their
profitability under different return generating processes.
Following Lehmann (1990) and Lo and Mackinlay (1990), we also use a weighted
relative strength strategy (WRSS) to decompose the returns from the momentum strategy.
However, instead of taking all the stocks with returns higher than the market return as winners
and all the stocks with returns lower than market returns as losers, our strategy will follow the
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typical momentum strategy that only includes top and bottom percentage stocks as winners and
losers.
We consider a collection of N securities and denote their period t returns
vector

,⋯,

a

1

. Following Lo and Mackinlay (1990), in this section, we offer the following

assumption:
Assumption 1:
≡
Γ

, where

follows a jointly covariance-stationary stochastic process with expected value
,

,⋯

and autocovariance matrices

0, sinceΓ

Γ

.

Specifically, the momentum strategy buys winners and sells losers at time based on
their performance from time period

1, , where k is the length of the time interval

1, .

The winning and losing outcomes are determined with respect to the equal-weighted return on
the entire market. Then, we first rank the stocks in descending order by their geometric mean
1,

returns over the

⋯

period, i.e.,

percentage of stocks, where 0
are losers. More formally, we allow

⋯

, where S is the top or bottom

. Hence, top SN stocks are winners and bottom SN stocks
to denote the fraction of the trading strategy

portfolio devoted to security i at time t, that is
1,2, … ,
0

1, … ,

(1)
1, … ,

where

0,

0 are parameters of the weights of the winner and loser portfolios,

the geometric mean return of security i at time interval
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1, ,

∑

is
is the

return of equal-weighted portfolio of all securities at time interval
of the time interval

1, , and k is the length

1, .

The weighting mechanism reflects the belief of an investor that price has continuations,
and the success of this strategy is based solely on the time-series behavior of stock prices. This
weighting mechanism permits us to decompose the returns of momentum strategy into timeseries and cross-sectional variations. It also permits us to determine the relative importance of
these components in predicting momentum returns and answer the frequently argued question of
whether the market is efficient or whether the stock prices have memory. More importantly,
securities that deviate more positively (negatively) from the market mean at time period
1,

will have greater positive (negative) weight in the time t portfolio. Considering only the top

and bottom S percentages of stocks in our momentum strategy, rather than all stocks, better
represents the belief in stock price continuations, because the strongest winners probably have
more momentum to continue winning and the worst losers probably have more momentum to
continue losing over an intermediate period.
The returns from such a strategy are simply
∑

.

(2)

Plugging the weight function (1) into (2) and taking expectations yields the following:
Γ

Γ

∑

∑

.

(3)

where tr(ּ) denotes the trace operator, Γ represents the autocovariance matrices for the loser
portfolio, and Γ represents the autocovariance matrices for the winner portfolio1.

1

The derivation of Equation (3) is included in Appendix 1.
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∑

∑

is the average return of the winner portfolio at time t,

is the

average return of the loser portfolio at time t.
1
where

∑

,

(4)
∑

is the average expected return of the winner portfolio,

average expected return of the nonwinner portfolio, Γ

, is the

represents the autocovariance matrices

for the interaction of past nonwinners and winners, and is the identity of corresponding
∑Γ . 2

dimension, for example, Γ

̅

1

Similarly,
where

∑

(5)
̅

is the average expected return of the loser portfolio,
̅

∑

, is the

̅

average expected return of the nonloser portfolio, and Γ represents the autocovariance matrices
for the interaction of past nonlosers and losers.
Combining Equation (3)-(5), we get3:
Γ

Γ

∑

∑
̅

1
Γ
1

̅
̅

Γ
1

1

1
̅

(6)

The first two terms in Equation (6) are the cross-sectional averages of the weighted firstorder time-series variance of the individual stock returns in the winner and loser portfolios,

2
3

The derivation of Equation (4) is included in Appendix 2.
The derivation of Equation (6) is included in Appendix 3.
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respectively. If the market is efficient, then these two terms should equal zero. The third and
fourth terms are the average first-order autocovariance between two stocks involving a winner or
loser stock and another stock. If the stocks have a lead lag structure, in that the larger firm leads
the smaller firm in responding to a specific common factor risk but in the same direction, then
the cross-autocovariance is positive. The fifth and sixth terms are cross-sectional variances of
the mean returns in the winner and loser portfolios. The size of the fifth and sixth terms
increases with increased variation of the mean returns in the winner and loser portfolio. The rest
of the terms are the summation of weighted products of expected returns. The fifth to ninth
terms are independent of the autocovariances, Γ . To measure the role of the ownautocovariances, cross-autocovariances, and cross-sectional variances separately, we further
arrange the terms in Equation (6) so that we decompose the expected momentum returns into
different parts indicated above:
1
1

Γ

Γ

1

–

̅

1

1

̅

Γ
1
1

Γ

1

̅

Γ

1

1

̅

Γ

We define
cross-autocovariance of individual stock returns,
is the own-autocovariance of individual stock returns, and
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1

Γ

̅

, which is the
1
, is the

Γ ,

cross-sectional variance of mean returns in the winner and loser portfolios. Thus, the expected
returns of the momentum strategy could be written as
1

1

1
̅

(7)

By deduction4, we get
1

1

1

Let

. (8)
̅

. Therefore,

.

(9)

Equation (9) shows clearly that the expected momentum returns could be decomposed
into four parts: a)

is dependent on only off-diagonals of the autocovariance matrixΓ , which is

the correlation between returns of two different stocks from two different time periods; b)

is

dependent on only the diagonals of autocovariance matrixΓ , which is the correlation of own
stock returns from two different time periods; c)

is independent of the autocovariance matrix

Γ , which is the cross-sectional variances of the mean returns in the winner and loser portfolios
for a given time period; and d)

is also independent of the autocovraiance matrix Γ , which is

the weighted product of winner portfolio mean return and its deviation from the mean return of
the whole portfolio plus the similar weighted product from the loser portfolio.
Equation (9) also indicates the scenarios in which the expected returns from the
momentum strategy become positive. Since , , are positive,

is always positive. The total

number of stocks is greater than 1, so if the summation of the own-autocovariances of the stock
returns in the winner and loser portfolios is positive, then

4

The derivation of Equation (8) is included in Appendix 4.
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is positive. However, the link

between the sign of

and stock return momentum is unclear. According to the definition of

own-autocovariance,

, when stock returns at time and

1are both greater or smaller than their mean,

is positive. Therefore, if

is positive, we

cannot conclude that there is stock return momentum. For example, assume a past winner’s
mean return is 15%. Its stock return at time

1 is 10%, and decreases to 5% at time .

Therefore, its own-autocovariance is positive, even though the return of this winner stock
declined in the current period. Similarly, if

is negative, we cannot conclude that there is

return reversal. Stock return momentum is also possible when

is negative. For instance,

assume a past winner’s mean return is still 15%. Its stock return increases from 10% to 30% at
time . In this case,
the sign of

is negative, but clearly, there is stock return momentum. To summarize,

cannot clearly indicate stock return momentum or reversal. However, if it is

significantly different from zero, it indicates that stock returns are serially correlated, but with
stock return pattern undetermined. Furthermore, the profitability of momentum strategy does not
require stock return momentum. Of course, if there is return momentum, momentum strategy is
more profitable. However, what is required in the momentum strategy is the stable relative
ranking of the stocks. If past winners remain winners in the next period, even if their stock
returns drop, or past losers stay as losers, even if their stock returns increase, the momentum
strategy works. Therefore, the momentum strategy relies on the return predictability belief:
winners continue to be winners and losers continue to be losers. The stock return momentum or
reversal is not specified. If the correlations of two different stocks from two different times are
positive, then

is negative.

is positive if the expected return of the winner portfolio is

positive and higher than the market expected return, and simultaneously, the expected return of
the loser portfolio is below zero and lower than the market expected return.
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3.2. Circumstance in Generating Positive Momentum Returns
We further investigate a return generating process that can result in a positive return from
the momentum strategy.
3.2a Returns follow random walk with starting point
Similar to Conrad and Kaul (1998), we allow returns

to follow a random walk with

, where

starting point , which was calculated as

is white noise or is

independently and identically distributed with 0 mean and constant variance. Thus, the stock
returns

are serially independent. Now, we further assume the returns of different stocks are

independent between different time periods. Therefore, Γ or both

and

are zero; hence, the

momentum return can be written as
(10)
is always positive, if

is positive. Thus, even though the stock returns do not have cross-

sectional or serial dependence, the momentum strategy can still generate positive returns.
However, these positive returns do not come from the stock return predictability or stock price
momentum. When the expected returns of the winner portfolio are positive and those of the
loser portfolio are negative, the momentum strategy generates increasingly large returns as the
winners win more and the losers lose more. In this scenario, even though the stock returns
follow random walk or the financial market is efficient, the momentum strategy can still generate
positive returns. Therefore, even if the returns from the momentum strategy are positive, we
cannot directly conclude that they can be attributed to the stock price momentum. Under the
above analysis of the return generating process we observe that the momentum returns are
determined by the sign and magnitude of the four components. We could not verify the stock
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return predictability that winners continue to win and losers continue to lose simply from the fact
that momentum returns are positive. Furthermore, we could not deny any stock return
predictability if the momentum returns are negative. In the literature, both Lo and MacKinlay
(1990) and Conrad and Kaul (1998) concluded under the random walk model that the momentum
strategy could generate profits equal to the cross-sectional variance in mean returns of individual
securities,

, even if stock returns are completely unpredictable. Similarly, zero or negative

momentum returns do not imply zero autocovarance automatically. The only method to
determining the possibility of stock return predictability is to decompose the momentum returns
and empirically measure their component magnitudes directly.

IV. Empirical Results
4.1. An Empirical Appraisal of Momentum Returns
To measure the relative importance of stock price predictability in generating returns
from the momentum strategy that we developed in Section III, we empirically decompose the
momentum returns into four parts: average cross-autocovariances (
autocovariances (
portfolios (

, average own-

, cross-sectional variances of the expected returns in the winner and loser

, and the expected returns of the winner and loser portfolios (

. By

investigating the composition of historical momentum returns directly, we reveal the sources and
their relative importance in constituting the momentum returns. All the stocks listed in the
NYSE & Amex, and Nasdaq markets are included in the study. The entire dataset includes over
27,000 stocks that have been traded in the U.S. stock market over the past 44-years period, from
January 1965 to December 2009. The data on stock returns were collected from the Center for
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Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Monthly Stock File for NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks.
Because the trading environments in NYSE and NASDAQ markets are different, stocks in
NYSE and Nasdaq markets are also investigated separately to evaluate the influence from market
differences.

4.1a Return decomposition
To find a potential pattern between the length of the ranking period k and the resulting
component weights, different ranking periods k equal to 3, 6, 9, and 12 months are examined
separately. The default weight parameters for the winner and loser portfolios are set to equal 1
(

1 in Equation (1). In addition, two types of momentum strategies are investigated

empirically. One is the rolling strategy, which is very similar to the most frequently investigated
momentum strategy. This strategy includes overlapping holding periods. In any given month t,
the strategy holds a series of portfolios that are selected in the current month as well as in the
previous k months if there are no skip months. The other strategy has no overlapping holding
periods, and it was used in the Lo and Mackinlay (1990) paper.
As the entire time span of 44 years is a rather long time period, four 10-year periods are
investigated separately to capture any potential change in the market environment. Before 1995,
there were invisibly small amounts of short-selling activities in the U. S. market. Because short
sales have been argued as a necessity in correcting overpriced assets, the short-selling level can
potentially affect momentum returns from the loser portfolio. It is also well known that in the
2005, to gather data and study thoroughly the effect of the uptick rule on market volatility, price
efficiency and liquidity, the SEC implemented a Pilot Program from May 2, 2005 to July 3, 2007.
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This Pilot Program suspended the uptick rule5 on one-third of Russell 3000 Index constituent
stocks with high levels of liquidity. On July 3, 2007, the SEC finally abolished Rule 10a-1 and
any rule of exchanges, including NASDAQ 3350, which applied a bid test on short sales (Bai,
2007). Therefore, this Pilot Program and the abolition of these price tests may improve the
trading environment for short sales, which makes the correction of stock overpricing easier and
hence affects the momentum returns from the loser portfolio. Therefore, years 1994 and 2004
were set as two cut-off points for the 10 year sub periods.
Table 1 demonstrates both the magnitudes and weights of the four components in the
momentum returns.

depends only on cross-autocovariances in which one stock’s return may

be correlated to another stock’s return in the previous period.

depends only on own-

autocovariances, which is also interpreted as stock price predictability.

is the cross-sectional

variation of the expected returns in the winner and loser portfolios for a given time.

depends

on the expected returns in the winner and loser portfolios. Of these four components, only
directly challenges the efficient market hypothesis that states that stock price has no memory. In
our empirical testing, the expected returns of the stocks are estimated using the average returns
over the entire time span. Because it is less likely that the expected stock returns remain the
same over the entire 44-year time span, investigating shorter time periods, such as 10 years,
becomes very meaningful. Because the momentum returns are time-series, all of the t tests are
adjusted for potential autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity by using the method of Kiefer and
Bogelsang (2002).
5

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had Rule 10a-1 under the Security Exchange Act of 1934, which
provided that investors must sell short a listed stock either at a price above the preceding sale price, known as the
plus tick or at the last sale price if it was higher than the last different price, known as the zero plus tick. Similarly,
NASDAQ Rule 3350 provided that short sales in NASDAQ stocks be either higher or at the best bid when the best
bid was below the preceding best bid (Bai, 2007)
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Table 1 shows that for rolling momentum strategies, the major determinant of the
momentum return is

, the autocorrelation of own stock returns. This measure is significant

most of the time at the 10 percent level and determines momentum returns to a great extent. In
comparison to

, two different stocks’ correlation between two different times,

, constitutes a

very small amount in the momentum returns and are much less frequently significant at the 10
percent level. Furthermore, the consistently negative sign of

shows that the trace of Γ in

Equation (28) is negative6. As analyzed in the previous section, the negative own stock return
autocorrelation does not specify whether the stock returns show a momentum or reversal pattern.
However, given the magnitude and significance of

, it is an important determinant of returns

from the momentum strategy. More interestingly, the magnitude of

decreases as the ranking

period k moves further away for all subperiods and the entire time span in the rolling strategy.
This pattern is logical.. Stock return predictability suggesting that winners continue to be
winners and losers continue to be losers should weaken as the reference point of time becomes
more remote. Such pattern is not observed in the other three components. The second most
significant component is

, the cross-sectional variance of expected returns in the winner and

loser portfolios at a given time. Conrad and Kaul (1998) suggested that cross-sectional variance
of expected returns was the main contributor to the momentum returns. However, Jegadeesh and
Titman (1999) argue that the large magnitude of
measurement error of expected returns.
is much smaller than

and

in Conrad and Kaul (1998) is due to the

is significant most of the times; however, its weight

. Berk, Green and Naik (1999) argue that

6

is the main

Conrad and Kaul (1998) decompose the expected returns from the momentum strategy. They denote the
and
as . The empirical results of
show that
is consistently negative. However, we
summation of
and
individually from their paper. So we do not know whether they get negative
cannot know the sign of
too as we do.
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contributor of the momentum returns. They explain that change of a firm’s systematic risk
causes the change of firm-specific variables and thus the cross-sectional variation of expected
return.
The sub-time periods all demonstrate similar patterns. However, the components are
more frequently significant and at a higher significant level in recent years. In the second subtime period from year 1965 to year 1974, none of the components was significant. It should be a
volatile market period during which the stock returns had minimal connections. The nonrolling
strategy demonstrates similar results, albeit at lower levels of significance. In the nonrolling
strategy, both

and

are the two most important components in terms of their weights in the

momentum returns. As observed for the rolling strategy,

is significant most of the time, albeit

with a much smaller weight. To summarize, the data in Table I indicates that stock returns do
have memory to some extent, and taking advantage of this phenomenon can generate profits.
This does challenge the market efficiency hypothesis to some extent. In addition, crosssectional variance of expected returns in the winner and loser portfolios is another important
source of momentum returns.
It is often observed in the momentum literature that when Nasdaq stocks are included in
the portfolio, the returns of the momentum strategy decrease dramatically. Table 2 decomposes
momentum returns for NYSE & AMEX stocks only to take advantage of market differences.
Both rolling and nonrolling strategies are investigated for the entire time span from 1965 to 2009
and for different ranking periods k. Similar patterns are observed as those in Table 1.

and

are the two most important sources for the returns from the momentum strategy and are
significant for most of the cases. The magnitude of
remote.

decreases as the ranking period moves

is significant most of times but with a much smaller weight. In the nonrolling
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strategy,

and

remain the two most important sources of the momentum returns. However,

is not significant at the 10 percent level.
Additionally, a few recent papers noted the following: (1) the proportional contributions
of the winner and the loser portfolios to the momentum abnormal returns are indeed asymmetric
(Hong, Lim and Stein, 2000, Lesmond, Schill and Zhou, 2004); and (2) the characteristics of the
loser firms are quite unique. Unlike the winners, the stocks that generate the bulk of the
momentum abnormal returns are the “losers” that can be characterized as small, low-price, highbeta, off-NYSE stocks. Those stocks are typically hard to sell short and involve high trading
costs (Lesmond, Schill and Zhou, 2004). To investigate the different influences of the winner
and loser portfolios on the momentum returns, we also change the weight parameters

or

for

winner and loser portfolios individually to examine their different effects on the sources of
momentum returns. Table 3 presents the magnitudes and weights of the four components by
increasing the weight of winner or loser portfolio monotonically while keeping the weight of the
other portfolio constant. To investigate only the effects from the different weights of the winner
and loser portfolios, the ranking period k is fixed at six. Specifically, the rolling momentum
strategy (6,0,1) is used in the analysis from January 1965 to December 2009 for NYSE & AMEX
stocks only. Panel A shows the results with increasing weights for the loser portfolio from = 1
to 10 or 50 while keeping the winner portfolio weight constant. The relative contributions of the
components to the momentum returns remain in proportion when the weight of the loser
portfolio increases. This indicates that the magnitude of the average own-autocovariance of the
winner portfolio in the holding period is negligible compared to that of the loser portfolio. Both
the own-autocovariances in the winner and loser portfolios took on a negative sign (data not
shown). However, the magnitude of the winner portfolio is about 20-fold smaller than that of the
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loser portfolio. This phenomenon is observed in all the four ranking periods. For example, at
k=6, the average own-autocovariances of the winner and loser portfolios are −0.00009765 and
0.0020, respectively. Therefore, the returns of the winner portfolio stocks are much more
random than that of the loser portfolio stocks and thus have a much weaker pattern to track over
time. In Panel B, the winner portfolio weight is increased while keeping the loser portfolio
weight constant. The magnitude of own-autocovariance does not change substantially. Hence,
winners’ return pattern is much less related over time or is more random than the loser portfolio.
Conversely, the loser portfolio has stronger return patterns in terms of own stock autocovariance.
These results obtained from the expected return decomposition clearly provide an underlying
explanation to the recent finding that the loser rather than the winner portfolio is the major
contributor to momentum returns. Therefore, to buy long and take advantage of the return
pattern from the winner portfolio is much less reliable than selling short and exploiting the much
stronger return predictability in the loser portfolio.

4.1b Empirical comparison of our model and the model in Lo and MacKinlay (1990)
The key difference between our model and the Lo & MacKinlay (1990) model is the
weighting scheme. Our momentum strategy includes only the top winners and bottom losers;
however, Lo & MacKinlay (1990) included all of the stocks in their portfolio. According to our
weighting scheme, our momentum strategy places more weight on the potential stronger stock
return patterns because the top winners and bottom losers have a stronger tendency to maintain
their return patterns in the next period. Without including the intermediate portfolio stocks, our
momentum strategy reduces the noise in the stock return patterns from the middle group stocks.
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Table 4 illustrates the empirical decomposition for the Lo & MacKinlay (1990) weighting
scheme. Both the rolling and nonrolling momentum strategies with different ranking periods k
are attempted for stocks listed in the NYSE & AMEX indices over the 44-year time span from
1965 to 2009. The key difference in the empirical results of the momentum strategy of Lo &
MacKinlay (1990) and our momentum strategy is that the average autocorrelation of own stock
returns

becomes much less important in explaining the momentum returns. Furthermore, it is

less frequently significant at the 10 percent level. This phenomenon can be explained by the
different weighting schemes. The top winners and bottom losers have a stronger tendency to
continue the current return patterns; therefore, by including only those top and bottom
performers, the magnitude of average own stock autocorrelation tends to be higher.

V. Conclusions
Momentum strategies that take advantage of potential return predictability have puzzled
finance researchers in the past twenty years. Heated dispute about whether the market is
efficient makes this topic even more attractive. Instead of trying to identify unknown risk factors
or behavioral theories that can fully explain momentum returns, our study attempts to decompose
the momentum returns directly and use historical data to discover the sources of the momentum
returns and their relative importance in generating the momentum returns.
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) proposed that the positive cross-autocovariance or the lead-lag
structure, rather than the small magnitude of the negative autocorrelation, drives the positive
contrarian portfolio returns. Conrad and Kaul (1998) further found in their return decomposition
that the positive cross-sectional variance in mean returns is responsible for the profitability of the
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momentum strategy. However, Lehmann (1990) and Jegadeesh (1990) argued that the first-order
serial correlation in stock returns is the major contributor to the contrarian returns.
Our empirical results demonstrate that autocorrelation of own stock returns is one of the
driving forces for the momentum expected returns. The magnitude of the own-autocorrelation
decreases as the ranking period becomes more remote. The second important source comes from
the cross-sectional variance of the mean return in the winner and loser portfolios at a given time.
The third important source is the difference in the expected returns between the winner and loser
portfolios. To our surprise, the cross-autocovariance does not contribute much to the momentum
expected returns. Thus, the lead-lag effect can generate momentum returns, but its effect is not
as significant as we previously thought.
Furthermore, by changing the weights of the winner and loser portfolios, we find that the
return pattern of the winner portfolio is much weaker than that of the loser portfolio. On the
contrary, the loser portfolio retains a much stronger return pattern from the ranking period to the
holding period. This provides further evidence to explain the recent finding that the loser
portfolio is the major contributor to the momentum returns. Therefore, the market may not be as
efficient as we previously believed
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Table 1. Return Decomposition with All Stocks in the U.S. Market
Decomposition of monthly returns from momentum strategies with a sample of all stocks in the
NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq from January 1965 to December 2009. To capture the possible
change of expected returns over the whole 44 years and to take into account of the potential
change of trading environment, 10 year subperiods are also investigated. Panel A lists the
magnitudes and weights of the four components and the size of the expected momentum returns
for the rolling momentum strategy. Panel B lists the results for nonrolling momentum strategy.
Different ranking periods (k) are examined with k=3, 6, 9, 12 months respectively. The default
weight parameters for the winner and loser portfolios are
1. The table reports tstatistics in parentheses, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by using Kiefer and
Bogelsang (2002) approach. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is indicated by a, b and
c, respectively.
Lag(k)
%
%
%
%
Panel A: Rolling strategy with winners and losers scheme
a)1965~~2009
3
-0.0001 -0.0053 0.0012 0.0001
-0.0042
2%
126%
-29%
-2%
(-0.94) (-6.93)a (5.99)b (9.42)a (-8.72)a
6
0.0002 -0.0038 0.0012
0.0001
-0.0027
-7%
141%
-44%
-4%
(1.23)
(-4.64)c (5.99)b (14.01)a (-5.14)b
9
0.0004 -0.0034 0.0013
0.0001
-0.0015
-27%
227%
-87%
7%
(4.28)c (-5.09)b (5.96)b (10.10)a (-4.34)c
12
0.0003 -0.0027 0.0013
0.0001
-0.0010
-30%
270% -130%
-10%
(-2.83)
(2.12) (-3.87) (6.01)b (8.35)a
b)1965-1974
3
-0.0001 -0.0024 0.0009 0.0005
-0.0011
9%
218%
-82%
-45%
(-0.27) (-1.54) (3.67)
(2.19)
(-1.56)
6
-0.0002 -0.0012 0.0009 0.0006
0.0001
-200% -1200%
900%
600%
(-0.93) (-1.26) (3.70)
(2.08)
(0.27)
9
0.0003 -0.0016
0.0009 0.0007
0.0003
100%
-533%
300%
233%
(2.08) (-2.56)
(3.69)
(2.01)
(1.90)
12
0.0001 -0.0012
0.0009 0.0008
0.0006
5%
-40%
30%
25%
(3.61)
(1.04) (-1.97)
(3.79)c (1.98)
c)1975-1984
3
0.0001 -0.0071
0.0015 0.0003
-0.0052
-17%
137%
-29%
-6%
(0.13)
(-4.56)c (4.88)b (3.23)
(-4.29)c
6
0.0005 -0.0045
0.0016 0.0004
-0.0021
-24%
214%
-76%
-19%
(-0.01) (-5.18)b (4.59)b (5.85)b
(-3.14)
9
0.0007 -0.0039
0.0016 0.0005
-0.0011
-64%
355%
-145%
-45%
(1.07) (-3.18) (4.90)b (6.11)a
(-1.52)
12
0.0005 -0.0030
0.0016 0.0006
-0.0003 -167% 1000%
-533%
-200%
(1.43)
(-4.44)c (5.23)b (5.29)b
(-0.81)
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Table 1. (continued)
Lag(k)
d)1985-1994
3
-0.0001 -0.0089
(-1.40) (-17.81)a
6
0.0004 -0.0069
(4.30)c (-10.40)a
9
0.0007 -0.0061
(5.32)b (-10.80)a
12
0.0003 -0.0047
(2.90) (-13.43)a
e)1995-2004
3
0.0009 -0.0092
(2.46) (-8.14)a
6
0.0010 -0.0069
(4.66)c (-10.99)a
9
0.0008 -0.0059
(5.63)b (-10.92)a
12
0.0008 -0.0054
(6.41)a (-9.03)a

%
0.0023
(7.63)a
0.0024
(7.87)a
0.0024
(8.28)a
0.0024
(7.68)a

0.0002
(6.69)a
0.0003
(7.94)a
0.0004
(9.21)a
0.0004
(8.70)a

0.0028
(6.98)a
0.0029
(7.33)a
0.0029
(8.00)a
0.0029
(8.88)a

0.0002
(12.10)a
0.0003
(22.19)a
0.0004
(23.88)a
0.0004
(20.31)a

-0.0065
(-8.64)a
-0.0037
(-4.29)c
-0.0026
(-3.22)
-0.0015
(-2.53)
-0.0053
(-6.30)a
-0.0026
(-5.21)b
-0.0018
(-2.93)
-0.0012
(-1.60)

%

2%

137%

-35%

-3%

-11%

186%

-65%

-8%

-27%

235%

-92%

-7%

-20%

313%

-160%

-27%

-17%

174%

-53%

-4%

-38%

265%

-112%

-12%

44%

328%

161%

22%

-67%

450%

-242%

-33%

243%

-157%

-14%

-225%

300%

25%

-57%

186%

14%

Panel B: Nonrolling strategy with winners and losers scheme
a)1965~~2009
3
-0.0002 -0.0017 0.0011 0.0001
-0.0007
29%
b
b
a
(-1.52) (-5.52)
(5.83) (8.06)
(-2.95)
6
-0.0000 -0.0009 0.0012 0.0001
0.0004
-0%
c
b
a
(-0.29) (-3.77)
(5.51) (13.69) (1.93)
9
-0.0003 -0.0004 0.0013 0.0001
0.0007
-43%
a
a
(15.89)
(3.15)
(-2.53) (-0.84) (6.29)
12
-0.0001 -0.0016 0.0013 0.0001
-0.0003
33%
b
a
(9.73)
(-1.00)
(-2.50) (-2.72) (5.26)
b)1965-1974
3
0.0005 -0.0015 0.0009 0.0004
0.0002
250%
c
(2.27)
(0.57)
(0.87) (-1.17) (3.81)
6
-0.0001 -0.0006 0.0009 0.0004
0.0006
-17%
a
(-0.85) (-1.42) (4.13)
(2.18)
(2.58)
9
-0.0001 -0.0006 0.0011 0.0008
0.0011
-9%
c
(-0.55) (-0.99) (3.35)
(1.94)
(4.76)
12
0.0002 -0.0010 0.0009
0.0005
0.0005
40%
c
(0.54) (-1.63) (4.51)
(1.98)
(0.81)
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%

%

533%

-433%

-33%

-750%

450%

200%

-100%

150%

67%

-55%

100%

73%

-200%

180%

100%

Table 1. (continued)
Lag(k)
c)1975-1984
3
-0.0001 -0.0031 0.0015 0.0003
-0.0014
b
(-0.21) (-1.95) (5.23)
(2.95)
(-1.31)
6
0.0007 -0.0026 0.0017 0.0004
0.0002
b
c
(0.85) (-1.98) (5.73)
(4.28)
(0.42)
9
-0.0002 -0.0007 0.0016 0.0005
0.0013
(-3.01) (-2.29) (3.90)c (6.56)a
(5.43)b
12
-0.0001 -0.0014 0.0020 0.0006
0.0010
c
a
b
(5.41)
(2.39)
(-1.10) (-4.40) (6.52)
d)1985-1994
3
0.0002 -0.0049 0.0024 0.0002
-0.0022
b
(2.95)
(-1.31)
(-0.21) (-1.95) (5.23)
6
0.0006 -0.0037 0.0025 0.0003
-0.0003
(2.24)
(-4.95)b (5.35)b (6.90)a
(-0.23)
9
-0.0004 -0.0009 0.0026 0.0004
0.0016
(5.41)b (10.26)a
(1.16)
(-4.51)c (-0.96)
12
-0.0002 -0.0029 0.0029 0.0004
0.0002
(-1.31) (-1.76) (4.04)c (14.04)a
(0.10)
e)1995-2004
3
0.0004 -0.0034 0.0029
0.0002
0.0001
(1.91)
(-5.83)b (5.47)b (12.84)a (0.13)
6
-0.0006 -0.0006 0.0034
0.0003
0.0025
c
a
(-2.58) (-1.10) (4.38)
(15.66)
(3.10)
9
-0.0001 -0.0020 0.0037
0.0004
0.0020
(-0.32) (-2.87) (3.94)c (18.52)a (1.39)
12
-0.0002 -0.0038 0.0044
0.0004
0.0008
a
(0.29)
(-1.28) (-2.51) (3.10) (15.50)
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%

%

%

7%

221%

-107%

-21%

350%

-1300%

850%

200%

-15%

-54%

123%

38%

-10%

-140%

200%

60%

-9%

223%

-109%

-9%

-200%

1233%

-833%

-100%

-25%

-56%

163%

25%

-100%

-1450% 1450%

200%

400%

-3400% 2900%

200%

%

-24%

-24%

136%

12%

-5%

-100%

185%

20%

-25%

-475%

550%

50%

Table 2. Return Decomposition with NYSE & AMEX Stocks Only
Decomposition of monthly returns from momentum strategies with stocks listed only in NYSE,
and AMEX markets from January 1965 to December 2009. Panel A lists the magnitudes and
weights of the four components and the size of the expected momentum returns for the rolling
momentum strategy. Panel B lists the results for nonrolling momentum strategy. Different
ranking periods (k) are examined with k=3, 6, 9, 12 months respectively. The default weight
parameters for the winner and loser portfolios are
1. The table reports t-statistics in
parentheses, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by using Kiefer and Bogelsang
(2002) approach. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is indicated by a, b and c,
respectively.
Lag(k)
%
%
%
%
Panel A: Rolling strategy with winners and losers scheme
3
-0.0002 -0.0031 0.0006 0.0000
-0.0026
8%
119%
-23%
-0%
(-2.04) (-8.63)a (4.31)c (1.94)
(-10.46)a
6
0.0002 -0.0021 0.0007 0.0000
-0.0013
-15%
162%
-54%
-0%
c
c
b
c
(1.44)
(-3.98)
(4.23)
(4.92)
(-4.28)
9
0.0003 -0.0019 0.0007 0.0001
-0.0008
-38%
238%
-88%
-13%
a
c
c
a
(-4.08)
(4.22)
(7.19)
(-3.12)
(6.10)
12
0.0002 -0.0013 0.0007 0.0001
-0.0004
-50%
325%
-175%
-25%
c
a
(1.68) (-2.45) (4.21)
(6.95)
(-1.34)
Panel B: Nonrolling strategy with winners and losers scheme
3
-0.0001 -0.0009 0.0006 0.0000
-0.0004
25%
(-0.83) (-3.01) (4.30)c (1.74) (-1.40)
6
0.0001 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0000
0.0004
25%
(0.51) (-2.69) (4.13)c (4.59)c (2.44)
9
-0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 0.0001
0.0007
-14%
(-0.63) (0.01) (4.45)c (6.61)a (2.86)
12
-0.0001 -0.0005 0.0007 0.0001
0.0002
-50%
(-1.45) (-1.85) (4.29)c (7.35)a (1.52)
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225%

-150%

-0%

-100%

175%

0%

0%

100%

14%

-250%

350%

50%

Table 3. Return Decomposition with Change of Weights
Decomposition of monthly returns from rolling momentum strategies with stocks listed only in
NYSE, and AMEX markets from January 1965 to December 2009. Different combination of ,
are examined with a fixed ranking period k=6. Panel A lists the magnitudes and weights of the
four components and the size of the expected momentum returns for the rolling momentum
strategy. Panel B lists the results for nonrolling momentum strategy. The table reports tstatistics in parentheses, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by using Kiefer and
Bogelsang (2002) approach. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is indicated by a, b and
c, respectively.
( , )
%
%
%
%
Panel A: Increasing loser portfolio weight with constant winner portfolio weight
(1, 1)
0.0002 -0.0021 0.0007 0.0000
-0.0013
-15%
162%
-54%
-0%
c
c
b
c
(1.44)
(-3.98)
(4.23) (4.92)
(-4.28)
(1, 10) 0.0028 -0.0206 0.0050 -0.0001 -0.0129
-22%
160%
-39%
1%
c
c
c
c
(2.71)
(-3.94)
(3.84) (-3.77)
(-4.28)
(1, 50) 0.0144 -0.0124 0.0242 -0.0008
0.0254
57%
-49%
95%
-3%
(2.81)
(-3.93)c (3.79)c (-6.08)a (4.26)c
Panel B: Increasing winner portfolio weight with constant loser portfolio weight
(1, 1)
0.0002 -0.0021 0.0007 0.0000
-0.0013
-15%
162%
-54%
-0%
c
c
b
c
(1.44)
(-3.98)
(4.23)
(4.92)
(-4.28)
(10, 1) -0.0010 -0.0030 0.0024 0.0006
-0.0011
91%
273%
-218% -55%
b
a
(9.05)
(-1.48)
(-2.36) (-3.13) (5.28)
(50, 1) -0.0063 -0.0069 0.0103 0.0028
-0.0001
6300% 6900% -10300% -2800%
b
a
(-2.95) (-1.86) (5.69)
(9.54)
(-0.03)
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Table 4. Return Decomposition following Lo & MacKinlay (1990)
Decomposition of monthly returns from momentum strategies with stocks listed only in NYSE,
and AMEX markets from January 1965 to December 2009. The weighting scheme follows the
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) paper with all the stocks included in the portfolio. Panel A lists the
magnitudes and weights of the four components and the size of the expected momentum returns
for the rolling momentum strategy. Panel B lists the results for nonrolling momentum strategy.
Different ranking periods (k) are examined with k=3, 6, 9, 12 months respectively. The default
weight parameters for the winner and loser portfolios are
1. The table reports tstatistics in parentheses, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by using Kiefer and
Bogelsang (2002) approach. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is indicated by a, b and
c, respectively.
Lag(k)
%
%
%
Panel A: Rolling strategy with all stocks included
3
-0.0001
-0.0002
0.0002
-0.0002
50%
100%
-100%
(-2.97)
(-4.15)c (5.66)b
(-8.49)a
6
-0.0000
-0.0002
0.0002
-0.0001
0%
200%
-200%
(-0.82)
(-2.59)
(5.55)b
(-2.66)
9
0.0000 -0.0002
0.0002
-0.0000
-0%
2000%
-2000%
(2.76)
(-4.33)c (5.47)b
(-0.62)
12
0.0001
-0.0001
0.0002
0.0000
1000%
-1000%
2000%
(0.32)
(-1.58)
(5.41)b
(2.03)
Panel B: Nonrolling strategy with all stocks included
3
-0.0001
-0.0001
0.0002
0.0000
-1000%
-1000%
2000%
(-0.72)
(-0.68)
(5.73)b
(1.29)
6
0.0000
-0.0001
0.0002
0.0001
0%
-100%
200%
(0.68)
(-1.24)
(5.37)b
(4.81)b
9
-0.0000
0.0000
0.0002
0.0002
-0%
0%
100%
(7.01)a
(-0.22)
(0.19)
(5.46)b
12
-0.0000 -0.0000
0.0002
0.0001
-0%
-0%
200%
(-0.69)
(-0.39)
(5.35)b
(8.97)a

48

APPENDIX

49

Appendix 1: Derivation of Equation (3)
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Appendix 3: Derivation of Equation (6)
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CHAPTER III
SHORT-SELLING CONSTRAINTS AND MOMENTUM ABNORMAL
RETURNS

Abstract
The winner and loser portfolios of momentum strategies are sensitive to different risks.
Short-selling can create a situation in which the loser portfolio is more profoundly affected; this
phenomenon may explain the bulk of the momentum abnormal returns that are asymmetrically
contributed by the loser portfolio. The short-selling risk also provides a possible explanation for
the finding in the first essay that the own-stock autocovariance is much more stable in the loser
portfolio and is the major contributor to the momentum abnormal returns. Using a pooled
interval regression, this study first estimated the realizable shorting demand by treating the
observed short interest data as the lower bound and the institutional ownership as a conservative
upper bound. The difference between the estimated realizable shorting demand and the realized
shorting demand is our proxy for the short-selling constraints. With this new proxy, we found
that the short-selling constraints and risks explained the momentum abnormal returns from the
loser portfolio strongly and independently. Stocks that are mostly short-selling constrained
generated the lowest returns. This return prediction in the momentum strategy supports the
mispricing explanation that stocks with more severe short-selling constraints prevent pessimistic
information from quickly being released into the stock price, causing those stocks to be
overpriced and autocorrelated in returns. Rather than immediately dropping to the true value,
constraints on short-selling cause the stock price to drop in a gradual fashion that is demonstrated
as stock return autocorrelation or predictability. We also found that the short-selling constraints
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are a key explanation for the well-known puzzle that including NASDAQ stocks in the
momentum strategy results in a drastic reduction in the momentum abnormal returns. Our study
also derives interesting inferences about the determinants of short-selling demand and lends
support to the abortion of the tick and bid tests in NYSE and NASDAQ.

I. Introduction
Recently a few papers have noted the following: (1) the proportional contributions of
the winner and the loser portfolios to the momentum abnormal returns are indeed asymmetric
(Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000, Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou, 2004); and (2) the characteristics of
the loser firms are quite unique. Unlike winners, the stocks that generate the bulk of the
momentum abnormal returns are the “losers” that can be characterized as small, low-price, highbeta, off-NYSE stocks. Those stocks are typically hard to sell short, and involve high trading
costs (Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou, 2004).
Due to the different characteristics of winner and loser portfolios, the winner and loser
portfolios can be sensitive to different risk exposures. Therefore, in order to understand clearly
the sources of the momentum abnormal returns, it is essential to look into the winners and losers
separately and investigate the specific risk factors that could affect the winners or losers as a
group. Given the overwhelming contribution the loser portfolio makes to the momentum
abnormal returns, this study will focus on the losers’ side of the phenomenon.
Specifically, this study will investigate the role of short-selling constraints and risk in
loser portfolio in order to explain momentum abnormal returns. Among all the risks that could
affect winner and loser portfolios, short-selling constraints and risk are the constraints and risk
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that impact much more on the loser rather than the winner portfolio. Therefore, the short-selling
constraints and risk that the losers are more sensitive to may play a very important role in
explaining the asymmetric contribution of loser portfolios, and hence the major source of the
momentum abnormal returns.
Since the short-selling constraints and risk are much more sensitive to the losers, it may
not reflect a significant level of explanatory power if the total momentum abnormal returns are
examined. Unlike previous literature that has focused on the explanations of the total
momentum abnormal returns, one of the contributions of this study is to investigate the shortselling risk on only the component momentum returns from the losers’ side.
The short-selling constraints and risk this essay investigates are the constraints and risks
that, due to economic and cultural reasons, make the investors (1) to bear higher costs or (2) to
live with the fact that short-selling is not always feasible due to regulatory restrictions or cultural
biases, or (3) to cope with the limited availability of stock to borrow, or (4) to shoulder the costs
of the premature short-squeeze repayment7, or (5) to bear the very high borrowing costs if the
stocks are special.
The most challenging impediment that researchers must attempt to overcome in our type
of research is the unobservability of the short-selling constraints. There are two major ways to
address this issue: (1) with proxy and (2) without proxy. Early research started by using the
short-interest ratio to proxy for the short-selling constraints. Later, this proxy was criticized as
being uninformative about short-selling constraints and risk because there is an ambiguous
7

When stock prices go up, short seller losses get higher, as sellers rush to buy the stock to cover their positions.
This rush creates a higher demand for the stock and quickly drives up the price even further. This phenomenon is
known as a short-squeeze. Premature short-squeeze repayment is the payments or the losses the short sellers are
forced to put in the accounts or to assume in liquidating their position, due to margin call, when short-squeeze
happens. Accessed on April 3,2010, at http://www.investopedia.com/university/shortselling/shortselling3.asp
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causality between short interest ratio and short-selling constraints. To wit, stocks may have low
level of short interest because there is low demand to short or they are subject to severe shortselling constraints. Another stream of proxies was developed under the framework of demand
and supply. It is argued that stocks are short-selling-constrained when there is a strong demand
to sell short and a limited supply of shares to borrow (Asquith, Pathak and Ritter, 2005).
Therefore, two variables are used together to proxy the short-selling constraints. Asquith, Pathak,
and Ritter (2005) use short interest ratios as a proxy for short-selling demand, and institutional
ownership as a proxy for lendable supply. They define the short-selling-constrained stocks as
those with the highest short interest ratios and lowest institutional ownership. However, as
mentioned earlier, short interest ratios may not be a good proxy for shorting demand, because the
measure is confounded. They argue that short-selling constraints are not common, because only
5% of the stocks on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ have more short interest than their
institutional ownership. However, shorting demand is a different concept than realized short
interest. That institutional ownership is larger than realized short interest does not clearly imply
the shorting demand is fully satisfied, because stock availability is only one type of short-selling
constraints. There can be other constraints, for example, uptick rules, which prohibited the shortselling transactions in certain circumstances before July 2005. Cohen, Diether and Malloy (2007)
utilize the price-quantity pairs to gauge short-selling risk in stocks. By using a proprietary
dataset consisting of loan fees and quantities shorted from a large institutional investor, they
employ loan fees as shorting price, and percentage of shares on loan as quantity to gauge the
short-selling constraints. They argue that an increase in the loan fee coupled with an increase in
the percentage of outstanding shares on the loan correspond to an outward shift of the shorting
demand. Similarly, a decrease in loan fees coupled with a decreased loan quantity represents an
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inward shift of the shorting demand. However, their proprietary dataset includes only one
institutional investor within a four-year span8.
It is well known in the literature that short-selling activities are unreasonably low in the
market. The majority of stocks virtually have no short interest outstanding at any given point of
time (Chen, Hong, and Stein, 2002). The realizable demand for shorting is probably much larger
than the recorded short interest. However, due to some short-selling constraints and risk, the
realizable demand is not observable. In this way, instead of serving as a usual proxy for shorting
demand, short interest actually represents the realized shorting demand. Therefore, if we could
find out the realizable demand for short-selling, then the difference between the realizable
shorting demand and the realized shorting demand represents the shares subject to some type of
short-selling constraints. This difference can serve as an alternative proxy for short-selling
constraints. Through this method, the short-selling constraints and risk are proxied by one
variable. This new method not only addresses the confounding problem of short interest ratios,
but also avoids establishing another proxy for supply. More importantly, this proxy accounts for
all types of short-selling constraints, named or unnamed, that have hindered potential shortselling transactions. Therefore, it is a more complete proxy for short-selling constraints. The
measure also complements the study of investigating only one short-selling constraint---stock
availability under the framework of demand and supply.
Due to the short-selling constraints, the observed short interest ratio only reflects part of
the realizable shorting demand. Therefore, the realizable shorting demand should be always
equal to or greater than the recorded short interest ratio, depending on the extent of short-selling
constraints. In other words, the observed short interest ratio always gives us the lower bound of
8

Hence, this sample cannot be representative of the entire shorting market.
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the realizable shorting demand. By the same token, theoretically, the shorting supply is a natural
upper bound of shorting demand that can be realized. D’Avolio (2002) shows that the main
suppliers of stock loans for short sales are institutional investors. Furthermore, Nagel (2005)
argues that short sales depend heavily on the existing owners of a stock, because the nonowner
investors cannot sell the shares short without borrowing shares from the existing owners in the
first place. Based on the research of Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005), institutional ownership
is greater than short sales for 95% of stocks among 5,500 domestic operating companies trading
on the NYSE and NASDAQ markets over the entire time period of 1980-2002. Therefore, it is
reasonable to use institutional ownership as a conservative upper bound for the realizable
shorting demand.
In our theoretical design, the realizable shorting demand always falls within an interval,
with the censoring values varying for each observation. Therefore, an interval regression can be
used to estimate the realizable shorting demand given the suppressed short interest ratio and
conservative institutional ownership. The interval regression is a generalization of the censorednormal model and the tobit model. While the tobit model requires one censoring threshold for
all the observations, the interval model allows the censoring values to vary across individual
observations. Compared to the censored-normal model, which only allows single-sided
censoring, i.e., left or right censoring, the interval model permits the data to have double-sided
censorings. Specifically, in the interval regression, the dependent variable for each observation
can be either point data, where the lower and upper bounds are the same as the observed value,
or interval data where the lower and upper bounds are different9.

9

For example, it is left-censored data where the lower bound is negative infinity, or right-censored data where the
upper bound is positive infinity
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After estimating the realizable shorting demand by using the pooled interval regression
model, our study will investigate first the direction and magnitude that various factors exert on
the realizable shorting demand. These market and individual stock factors are: (a) market to
book ratio as in Barberis and Shleifer (2003); (b) institutional ownership, as in Nagel (2005); (c)
analyst forecast dispersion as in Diether et al. (2002); (d) trading volume as in Lee and
Swaminatham (2000); (e) liquidity as in Sadka (2006); (f) firm level volatility as in Ang et al.
(2006); (g) size as in Lewellen (2002); and (h) options, call or put, as in Ofek, Richardson and
Whitelaw (2004). Secondly, the study uses the obtained proxy for short-selling constraints from
the pooled interval regression model to examine directly whether and how well the short-selling
constraints can explain the momentum abnormal returns from the loser portfolio.
The pooled interval regression shows that short sale is a contrarian sign, and investors
tend to short more when the current and past returns are high. Similarly if the stock has a
potential of price increase as indicated by a high market-to-book ratio, the shorting demand
declines. Furthermore, short sellers are rational in taking risks and try to avoid unnecessary risks.
When the market has higher past return volatility or higher controversy about stock valuation,
the short sellers will short less to avoid potential higher risk. Similarly, if a particular stock is
more liquid as indicated by a higher trading volume or by a large but not too large firm size, the
shorting demand increases. Therefore, even though in literature trading volume has been treated
as proxy for either liquidity or difference of opinions, our study shows that it is more of a proxy
for liquidity. We also find that short sellers are informed, rather than noise traders. For example,
when the market indicates that it is more likely the information will be permanently embedded in
the stock price, the shorting demand becomes higher. Option markets also have complementary
rather than substitution effects on short sales.
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By double sorting the above control variables and the short-selling constraints, we find
strong evidences that short-selling constraints demonstrate an independent and persistent
explanatory power in predicting the cross-sectional variation of stock returns, even after holding
the control variables constant. More importantly, these cross-sectional variation of stock returns
consistently show the same pattern that stocks which are most severely short-selling constrained
generate the lowest returns. This is because when stocks are short-selling constrained; the
pessimistic information will not be released to the stock price quickly. Thus, those stocks are
severely overpriced and the returns are significantly smaller.
To further investigate how strong and important the short-selling constraints in
explaining the momentum abnormal returns, we run and compare the Fama-French three factor
model and our modified four factor model with the short-selling constraints as the fourth factor
on the momentum portfolio returns. It is well known in literature that the Fama-French three
factor model is the most efficient model in predicting the cross-sectional stock return variations.
However, our four factor model improves the explanatory power of the original Fama-French
three factor model significantly on the momentum portfolio returns. More interestingly, the
increase of the explanatory power of our modified four factor model comes from the loser
portfolio returns, rather than the winner portfolio returns. This asymmetric explanatory power
between the loser and winner portfolio returns clearly verifies our previous idea that short-selling
constraint is a risk loading that affects losers most. Furthermore, it does capture additional risk
loading that the well-established Fama-French three factor model does not pick up.
Our study also provides an answer to the long-puzzled phenomenon that when NASDAQ
stocks are added into the portfolio, the returns from the momentum strategy decrease greatly.
We find that the decrease of the momentum returns asymmetrically comes from the increase of
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loser portfolio returns. However, adding in the NASDAQ stocks does not change the returns
from the winner portfolio much. The increase in loser portfolio returns can be attributed to the
shorting environment in the NASDAQ market. Through two sample t-tests and ordinary least
squares regression, we find that the short-selling constraints are significantly less in the
NASDAQ market than in the NYSE & AMEX. Therefore, pessimistic information can be
reflected into stock price more quickly for the NADSAQ stocks, which leads to less overpricing
or higher returns in the losers from the NASDAQ market.
We also use the proxy of short-selling constraints developed in our study to verify
whether the price tests are efficient tools in the short sale markets. By utilizing paired t-tests and
two-sample t-tests on the difference of difference in the SEC pilot program, we find price tests
are not effective tools in controlling short-selling activities. This is mainly because short sellers
can avoid the price restrictions by routing their orders to other markets that do not have such
rules. This phenomenon is prominent in the NASDAQ market. Thus, it further supports the
previous finding that NASDAQ stocks are less short-selling constrained. Based on these
findings, we suggest the removal of the tick and bid rules in both markets, under normal market
conditions to reduce the regulatory burden that has no significant regulatory benefits. However,
this conclusion may not be suitable under abnormal market conditions, such as market crash,
when aggressive shorting is more likely to happen.
The contributions of our study to the extant literature are: First, unlike previous studies
which use the same risk factors to explain the total or the combination of both the winners’ and
the losers’ returns, our study argues that the impact of the risk factors to the long and short sides
are different; hence, we investigate the short-selling risk particular to the short side returns,
which comprise the bulk of the momentum abnormal returns. Second, our study creates a more
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complete proxy for short-selling constraints, which includes almost all types of short-selling
constraints. This new proxy complements the previous studies that focused on one short-selling
constraint, stock availability under the framework of demand and supply. Third, our study also
provides an explanation on how shorting demand is determined, and how different market and
individual stock characteristics can affect it. Fourth, our study is the first study to solve the longobserved puzzle in momentum literature that when NASDAQ stocks are included in the strategy,
the momentum returns drop substantially. Finally, our study also offers collateral evidence to the
long debated overpriced-stock question from a different viewpoint, i.e., the momentum strategy
perspective.

II. Short-Selling Risks
Short selling is the trading technique used by investors who try to profit from an expected
downward trend of stock prices. Short selling is a very risky technique that requires precise
timing and runs contrary to the overall movement of the market. Even if the investors correctly
identify the overpriced stock, they could lose money as the overpriced stock could have been
even more overpriced. Furthermore, the investors who sell short face unlimited downside
potential for losses as the stock price can also rise without cap.

2.1. Short-Selling Mechanics
Short-selling mechanics are different and more complicated compared to the long
transaction. Short sale involves selling a stock that the seller does not own. Therefore, the seller
has to borrow shares from the lender with collateral and simultaneously sell them at the current
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market price. At this point, the stock borrowers need to pay a fee to the lender as part of the
transaction costs. At the same time, since the collateral the seller gives to the lender while
borrowing is almost always cash, the lender need to pay an interest rate to the borrower on
holding the cash for a period. The difference of the fee that the borrower needs to pay the lender
and the interest rate on cash collateral that the lender needs to pay the borrower is called the
rebate rate. If the stocks are easy to borrow then the rebate rate is positive, which means the
lender needs to pay the rebate rate to the borrower by holding an amount of cash collateral for a
period of time. In this situation, the stocks are called general collateral. However, if the stocks
are hard to borrow, the fee the borrower needs to pay to the lender could be very high, such that
the fee exceeds the interest rate charged on the cash collateral that the lender needs to pay. In
this way, the rebate rate reflects a negative number, which indicates that not only the lender can
hold the cash for free; the borrower will pay additional money to get a stock loan. In this
situation, the stocks are called special. At a specific date in the future, the seller has to return the
borrowed shares to the lender. If the stock price drops, the seller can profit from the difference
of the beginning and ending price plus the interest rate on cash collateral less the commissions
and borrowing costs if the stocks are special.

2.2. Short-Selling Risks
Short selling involves many unique risks, such as regulations, institutional and cultural
biases, availability of stocks, high borrowing costs if stocks are special and premature shortsqueeze repayment.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had Rule 10a-1 under the Security
Exchange Act of 1934, which provided that investors must sell short a listed stock either at a
price above the preceding sale price, known as the plus tick or at the last sale price if it was
higher than the last different price, known as the zero plus tick. Similarly, NASDAQ Rule 3350
provided that short sales in NASDAQ stocks be either higher or at the best bid when the best bid
was below the preceding best bid (Bai, 2007). In other words, regulations prohibit selling short
the stock if it is already in the downturn. This rule in effect prevents traders from earning large
profits by driving down a stock price through heavy short selling first, and then taking a long
position. In addition, short selling is margin trading, and the seller must meet the minimum
maintenance requirement of 25 percent; otherwise the seller will be subject to a margin call.
Almazan et al. (1999) also points out that 70 percent of mutual funds explicitly state (in
Form N-SAR handed to the SEC) that short selling is not permitted, and only 2% actually do sell
short due to cultural biases.
Since the lender maintains the right to cancel a loan at any time, the seller faces recall
risk of the borrowed securities. Much worse, if a stock starts to rise and a large number of short
sellers try to cover their positions at the same time; the sellers will face a short squeeze, which
can drive the price even higher.
The short sellers may not able to locate the shares to borrow in the market. When the
demand to short a stock exceeds the supply in the market, the stock becomes special and the
borrowing costs will rise appreciably.
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2.3. SEC Pilot Program
In order to gather data and study thoroughly the effect of the uptick rule on market
volatility, price efficiency and liquidity, the SEC implemented a Pilot Program from May 2,
2005 to July 3, 2007. This Pilot Program suspended the uptick rule on one-third of Russell 3000
Index constituent stocks with high levels of liquidity. On July 3, 2007, the SEC finally abolished
Rule 10a-1 and any rule of exchanges, including NASDAQ 3350, which applied a bid test on
short sales (Bai, 2007).
There were three categories of pilot stocks in the program. Category A securities were
not subject to the uptick rule, Category B securities were not subject to the rule from 4:15pm ET
until the open of the consolidated tape10 the next day at 4:00am ET. All other securities were
included in Category C and were not subject to the rule from the close of the consolidated tape at
8:00pm ET until the open of the consolidated tape the next day. Since April 2005 the
consolidated tape opens at 4:00am and closes at 8:00pm (Bai, 2007).

III. Literature Review
Based on whether or not the argument is in support of the efficient market hypothesis, the
sources of momentum abnormal returns can be grouped into two competing explanations:
rational and behavioral explanations. In addition to the above two explanations, the market
frictions explanation is a newly developed direction to explain the momentum abnormal returns.

10

The "consolidated tape" is a high-speed, electronic system that constantly reports the latest price and volume data
on sales of exchange-listed stocks. The data reflected on the consolidated tape derive from various market centers,
including all securities exchanges, electronic communications networks (ECNs), and third-market broker-dealers.
The Nasdaq Stock Market runs a similar tape for its securities. Access at http://www.sec.gov/answers/consolt.htm
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Our study of short-selling risk dwells on the market frictions explanation. The investigation of
the role of short-selling risk in the momentum strategy is limited in number.

3.1. Market Frictions Explanation
The literature has long recognized the important role of transaction costs in realizing
momentum abnormal returns. However, due to data availability problems, and the lack of
accurate calculation methods, until recently, only two papers have calculated systematically the
transaction costs in executing the momentum strategy.
Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (LSZ) (2004) find that winners and losers traded in the
equally-weighted momentum strategy are stocks with disproportionately large transaction costs;
especially losers, characterized as small, low price, high beta, off-NYSE stocks, that are hard to
sell short and incur the highest trading costs. Furthermore, it is the loser not the winner
portfolios that drive the majority of the momentum abnormal returns. As a result, the transaction
costs totally erode the illusionary “paper” profit of the equally-weighted momentum strategy.
They also tested size-based portfolios as in Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), and turnover-based
portfolios as in Lee and Swaminathan (2000). But they find that strategies with larger paper
profits are accompanied by disproportionally larger trading costs. Therefore, they bring up the
market frictions explanation that slower price updating is due to larger trading costs, as a
competing theory to the slow information diffusion explanation introduced by Hong and Stein
(1999).
Unlike LSZ (2004), Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) provide some evidence to support the
inefficient market hypothesis. They argue that transaction costs, in the form of spreads and price
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impacts of trades, do not fully explain the abnormal profits from the value-weighted and
liquidity-weighted momentum strategies. However, their calculation of transaction costs is not
complete, because short-selling costs for the loser portfolio are not included.
Sadka (2006) decomposes the firm-level liquidity into variable and fixed price effects and
estimates liquidity using intraday data for the period 1983-2001. He finds that the unexpected
systematic or market-wide variations of the variable components of liquidity are priced in the
momentum abnormal returns. As the variable components of liquidity are typically associated
with private information, a substantial part of momentum abnormal returns are to compensate for
the unexpected variations in the aggregate ratio of informed traders to noise traders. Unlike most
of the studies that focus on the level of liquidity as a stock characteristic, Sadka emphasizes the
market-wide liquidity as an undiversifiable risk factor. The liquidity measure used in his study is
defined as the price-impact induced by trades. Because market liquidity risk affects the short
transactions, the systematic liquidity will be included in the short-selling constraints analysis.
Our study is probably the first research utilizing this liquidity index to examine the short-selling
constraints and momentum strategy.
Sadka and Scherbina (2007) document a close link between stock mispricing and
liquidity by investigating stocks with high analyst disagreement about future earnings. They
show that heterogeneous beliefs tend to be associated with high transaction costs. Therefore,
selling such high-disagreement stocks is considerably less profitable after accounting for the
extra transaction costs. They also conjecture that this can be a reason that mispricing has
persisted through the years. This observed positive relationship between analyst disagreement
and trading costs is consistent with the theoretical models, which predict that trading costs
increase with the degree of information asymmetry between the market maker and informed
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investors, and decrease with the amount of noise trading. Because the higher the analyst
disagreement about future earnings, the higher the information asymmetry among the market
participants. Therefore, the market makers will raise the cost of trading to protect themselves
against potential adverse selection. Sadka and Scherbina find that in the cross-section of highdisagreement stocks, less liquid stocks are more likely to be overpriced, evidenced by their low
future returns relative to that of more liquid stocks. In the time series, changes in aggregate
liquidity are negatively related to the magnitude of mispricing. Increases in the liquidity reduce
the costs of arbitrage and accelerate the convergence of prices to fundamentals.
Ali and Trombley (2006) is the first paper to examine the role of short-selling constraints
in preventing the arbitrage of momentum abnormal returns. Loan fees charged by the lenders are
direct costs of short selling and are treated as the proxy for the short-selling constraints in this
study. However, due to data availability problems, they construct Prob as a proxy for a stock
being special. Prob is estimated by the predicted cumulative distribution function of the Logit
model regressed by D’ Avolio (2002). Six significant variables in the Logit model are selected
to estimate Prob, namely, Size, IO (institutional ownership), Turn (turnover ratio), CF (cash
flow), IPO, and Glam (indicator variable equal to 1 if the stock is in the lowest three deciles of
book-to-market). The coefficients used in D’ Avolio (2002) are averages of individual monthly
regressions. Ali and Trombley examine the momentum abnormal returns by first sorting Size, IO,
Turn, CF, IPO, Glam and Prob individually. The results show that portfolios with smaller size,
higher turnover, lower cash flow, lower institutional ownership, IPOs, lowest three deciles of
book-to-market, and higher short-selling constraints have higher momentum abnormal returns.
The notable finding is that for all these sorting criteria, the winners’ portfolios do not vary much,
and the majority of the momentum abnormal returns are driven from the losers’ portfolios. The
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authors then double sort Prob, with size, residual analyst coverage, price, turnover ratio and
frequency of zero-return trading days. They find that momentum abnormal returns are
significant most of the time and thus Prob has an incremental explanatory power for momentum
abnormal returns.
Boni and Womack (2006) show that analysts create value in their recommendations
mainly through their ability to rank stocks within industries, in which they specialize. They find
that the monthly momentum strategy within each industry of buying the firms net upgraded by
analysts while selling short net downgraded firms yields 1.23 percent in the next calendar month,
which is about 30 percent more than a similar non-industry approach. Furthermore, among the
total of 57 industries, 54 industries are nominally positive, and 16 industries are significantly
positive. This short-term price momentum may be partly driven by returns of firms with more
analyst coverage leading the returns of firms with less coverage in the same industry. However,
when analyst information are aggregated across industries, the momentum strategy of buying
stocks in net upgraded industries and shorting stocks in net downgraded industries generally does
not offer statistically significant returns.

3.2. Proxies for Short-selling Constraints
Because short-selling risk is unobservable, financial researchers have tried many different
variables to proxy it. The oldest proxy for short-selling risk is short-interest ratios. Later
because of data availability from large institutions, the loan fee, i.e. the rebate on the borrowed
stock, is used as a direct proxy to gauge the short-selling risk. Most recently, institutional
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ownership of stocks has been considered as another proxy for short-selling constraints, because
most short transactions are conducted by the institutions.
Figlewski (1981) first uses short interest as a proxy for short-selling constraints. This
underlying logic is that the more the shorting demand is, the more likely it is subject to shortselling constraints. Thus, he uses the short interest as a proxy for actual shorting demand, and as
a result, a proxy for short-selling constraints. Many papers follow suit, such as Brent et al.
(1990), Figlewski and Webb (1993), Wooldridge and Dickinson (1994), Asquith and Meulbroek
(1995), and Dechow et al. (2001).
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) argue that the use of actual short interest as proxy of shortselling constraints could reduce the test power of the relationship between short-selling
constraints and subsequent stock returns. First, because a stock with low or zero short interest
could be the one that is hard or costly to sell short, it may hold back more negative information
from the market price. Second, tracking the abnormal returns of a portfolio of high-short-interest
stocks only potentially reduces the test power and generalizability of the results. Instead, they
use breadth of ownership, which is defined as the number of investors with long positions in a
particular stock, as a more reliable proxy for how tightly short-selling constraints bind. They
argue that when breadth for a stock is lower, fewer investors are trading on the stock and less
pessimistic information is released to the market.
Jones and Lamont (2002) study the effect of short-selling constraints on stock returns
from 1926 to 1933, when the costs of borrowing stocks are publicly available. They criticize the
short interest as a proxy for shorting demand. The quantity of shorting represents the
equilibrium of supply and demand, not just demand. Short interest can be negatively correlated
with shorting demand, overpricing and shorting costs. They argue that the problematic nature of
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short interest leads to weak empirical results. Instead, they use the rebate rate as the proxy for
short-selling constraints. They find stocks that are expensive to short or enter the borrowing
market have high valuations and low subsequent returns, which is consistent with the overpricing
hypothesis.
Gene D’ Avolio (2002) introduces a supply and demand framework to proxy short-selling
constraints the first time in literature. He uses a special 18 month dataset provided by a large
institutional lending intermediary on loan supply, loan fees, and loan recalls. He treats loan fees
and recalls as short-selling constraints.
Nagel (2005) categorizes the short-selling constraints into indirect and direct constraints.
The indirect constraints come from institutional and cultural reasons, which result in a general
lack of short-selling in the stock market. If the existing owners are not sophisticated enough, the
stock can become overpriced, because other sophisticated investors cannot sell it short. Since
institutional investors are likely to be more sophisticated than the general public, indirect
constraints are more likely to affect stocks with low institutional ownership. The direct
constraints come from the cost of short-selling. Since the main suppliers of stock loans are
institutional investors (D’ Avolio, 2002), stocks with low institutional ownership are harder to
borrow and thus incur higher costs. Therefore, both direct and indirect short-selling constraints
indicate that institutional ownership plays an important role in the short transaction, and Nagel
uses institutional ownership to proxy short-selling constraints. Because size can also affect
market friction and serve as an impediment to arbitrage other than the short-selling mechanism,
Nagel uses residual institutional ownership in the empirical tests to purge out the size effects.
The residual institutional ownership is obtained as the residual in the cross-sectional regressions
where size is the independent variable.
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Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) further develop the supply and demand framework
introduced by D’ Avolio (2002). They argue that stocks were short-sale-constrained when there
is a strong demand to short and a limited supply to borrow. They use both short interest, which
proxies for demand and institutional ownership, which proxies for supply to represent the shortselling constraints. However, as mentioned before, short interest is an ambiguous proxy for
shorting demand.
Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007) use the price-quantity pairs to identify the shift of
shorting supply and demand by using a proprietary data on short sale loan fees and quantities
from a large institutional investor. They argue that when the shorting demand shifts outward or
shorting supply shifts inward, the short-selling constraints are more likely to be severer.
Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2006) use the loan fee rather than the rebate rate in their
study to proxy for the short-selling constraints. They argue that loan fee is better because it
properly adjusted for changing in interest rate conditions that impact rebate rates. However,
because the fee data are available for only a limited time period, they use the data primarily to
validate other constraint proxies, like relative short interest and exchange-traded options, and to
develop a “portmanteau” constraint metric. This unitary constraint metric is obtained by
regressing on relative short interest and the dummy variable, options.
Ali and Trombley (2006) utilize the research by D’ Avolio (2002), and create the variable
Prob to proxy short-selling risk. The Prob is constructed as the predicated value of the
dependent variable conditional on the six significant determinants of a stock being special in the
logit model from D’ Avolio (2002).
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3.3. Other Factors Influencing Short-Selling Risk
The literature has recognized some additional factors that may directly or indirectly affect
the short interest, such as options, differences of opinion, et cetera.

3.3a Options
As early as 1993, Figlewski and Webb (1993) had found empirical evidence that options
facilitate short selling. They explain this phenomenon as follows: when a put is purchased from
an option market maker, the market maker will normally hedge by shorting the stock, and/or
buying a call to reverse the position. This is equivalent to the income effect. However, at the
same time, the introduction of options will substitute for part of the short interest, and hence
reduce the total short interest. Figlewski and Webb expect this substitution effect as a weaker
effect for two reasons. First, compared to a large number of hedging strategy traders, like
“protective put” buyers, only a small number of investors are active short sellers. Second, even
if former short sellers do switch their trading to options, the options market makers may simply
respond by shorting the underlying stock themselves to hedge their positions, thus leaving total
short interest unchanged. Therefore, the put buyer’s desire to sell the stock is transformed
through the options market into an actual short sale by a market professional who faces the
lowest cost and fewest constraints. Consequently, they argue that introducing options trading
can potentially reduce or even eliminate the informational effect of short-selling constraints, by
providing alternative trading strategies for investors with pessimistic information to sell short
indirectly. Their empirical results support this argument partially by showing that subsequent
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underperformance is weakened for optionable stocks. However, the result is not statistically
significant at the 5% level.
Sorescu (2000) finds that the effect of option introduction on underlying stock prices
switches during 1973-1995. While, before July 1981, the option introduction increased stock
prices, the price effect switched to negative after July 1981. Although he does not elaborate on
the specific reasons for this astounding shift, he lists possible causes, such as the introduction of
index options in 1982, the implementation of regulatory changes in 1981, and the possibility that
the options help the dissemination of negative information.
Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) confirm the results in Sorescu (2000) that option listings
are followed by negative abnormal returns of the underlying stock during the period of 19811995, and with positive abnormal returns during the period of 1973-1981. However, for both
sub-periods, option introductions increase the short sales. Their study also finds that the negative
abnormal returns in the post-1981 era are driven by a firm’s beta and the dispersion of investor
expectations. This relationship does not exist for the pre-1981 era.
Ofek, Richardson and Whitelaw (2004) provide an empirical analysis of put-call parity in
the context of short-selling constraints. Violations of put-call parity are asymmetric in the
direction of the short-selling constraints. In particular, both the probability and magnitude of the
violations can be linked directly to the magnitude of the rebate rate, a proxy for short-selling
constraints. Moreover, both the size of the violations and the rebate rate predict negative excess
stock returns.
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3.3b Differences of Opinion
The presence of heterogeneous expectations or differences of investor opinions has been
modeled in several analyses within the context of asymmetric information. Many papers have
attempted to find out the potential relationship between differences of opinion and subsequent
stock prices.
Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) have provided empirical evidence that stocks with
higher dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts have lower future returns than similar stocks.
The supporting theoretical framework is proposed by Miller (1977) that prices will reflect a more
optimistic valuation if pessimistic investors are kept out of the market by some kind of shortselling constraints. Diether et al. argue that the incentive structure of the analysts, which
discourages analysts from voicing pessimistic forecasts, is just another form of short-selling
constraint. Therefore, the bigger the disagreement about a stock’s value, the higher the market
price relative to the intrinsic value of the stock, and the lower the future returns. This effect is
also found most pronounced in small stocks and stocks that have performed poorly over the past
years. Diether et al. also test the role of dispersion in analysts’ earnings per share forecasts as a
proxy for measuring risk, instead of differences of opinion. Investors who are not well
diversified will demand to be compensated more for bearing the stock’s idiosyncratic risks.
Therefore, more dispersion in analysts’ forecasts may indicate more volatile future returns, and
thus, may serve as compensation for idiosyncratic risks. However, the negative relationship
between dispersion and future returns rejects this interpretation of dispersion as a measure of risk.
They also find the average return differential between the low- and high-dispersion stocks has
declined in the period 1992-2000, and becomes insignificant for all but the smallest size quintile.
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They attribute this phenomenon to lower short-selling costs, and more availability of firm-related
information which lowers the levels of disagreement in analyst opinions.
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find that the past trading volume predicts both the
magnitude and the persistence of future price momentum. Information contained in past trading
volume can be useful in reconciling intermediate horizon “underreaction” and long-horizon
“overreaction” effects. They further investigate the role of past trading volume for prediction of
cross-sectional stock returns. More importantly, they find the trading volume as measured by the
turnover ratio, is an unlikely candidate as a liquidity proxy. Trading volume is not highly
correlated with firm size or relative bid-ask spread, and the volume effect is independent of the
firm size effect. Rather, they argue that the information content of the trading volume is related
to market misperceptions of firms’ future earnings prospects. This finding indicates that investor
expectations affect not only a stock’s return but also its trading activity. Furthermore, they find
trading volume “fuels” momentum only for losers and helps information “diffusion” only for
winners.
Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2006) point out that two necessary and sufficient
conditions for Miller’s overvaluation are that i) the security is subject to short-selling constraints
and ii) investors have heterogeneous expectations. They argue that the reason the previous
empirical studies derive mixed results is that only one of the two conditions is tested at a time.
Consequently, they reexamine the overvaluation effect in a two-dimensional framework with
both conditions binding simultaneously.
Their results suggest that neither the presence of short-selling constraints nor a high
dispersion of opinions can independently lead to overpricing of the stocks. However, when these
two factors are considered simultaneously, they find Miller’s overreaction effects are so severe
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that the stocks underperform by as much as 21% per year relative to the Fama-French four-factor
asset-pricing model11 over the period of 1988-2002. This level of underperformance is
significantly more severe than observed in any previous study. Boehme et al. use three separate
proxies for differences of opinion: i) dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, ii) idiosyncratic volatility
of stock returns (SIGMA) and iii) trading volume as a proportion of shares outstanding. The
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts is the coefficient of variation for analysts’ annual forecasts
estimated from IBES data. It is derived by dividing the IBES reported standard deviation of
analyst earnings per share forecasts for the current fiscal year-end by the absolute value of the
mean earnings per share forecast, as listed in the IBES Summary History file. SIGMA is the
standard deviation of the error terms from the Brown and Warner (1985) market model,
estimated over the 100 days preceding the first day of the month for which the short interest data
are reported.

IV. Theory and Hypotheses
Some recent studies have concluded that the contributions of the winner and loser
portfolios to the momentum abnormal returns are asymmetric. Surprisingly, the losers, not the
winners, are the dominant driving force of the puzzling abnormal returns from the momentum
strategy. Therefore, the unique characteristics the losers possess (and the risk factors that they
are more sensitive to) have become a natural focus of the ongoing research. The losers belong to
the small, low-price, high-beta, off-NYSE stocks that are typically hard to sell short and involve
high trading costs (Lesmond, Schill and Zhou, 2004). Furthermore, unlike the winners, losers
11

∗

The Fama-French four-factor asset pricing model is
∗
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are involved in a different trading activity: short-selling. Therefore, they are impacted uniquely
by the short-selling risk that the winners do not face.
Meanwhile, another avenue of research has grown fast and has argued strongly that shortselling constraints can withhold pessimistic opinions from the market and can thus lead to an
overpricing of these stocks. The baseline for this argument is that when some stocks are
underpriced, the sophisticated investors with full information could always bid a higher price in
the market and buy them. However, if some stocks are overpriced, the sophisticated investors
cannot sell them if they do not own them in the first place, nor can they borrow them from their
current owners who do not have enough information and do not believe the stocks they own are
overpriced12.
If the above logic makes sense in the market, then the phenomenon of losers continuing
to perform badly in the momentum strategy may be explained by the short-selling constraints,
which hinder pessimistic opinions from influencing the prices quickly enough. However, the
mechanism underlying the explanation of the short-selling risk is totally different from that of the
behavioral hypotheses. The short-selling risk explanation assumes that the investors are rational,
regardless of whether they are pure or adaptive. The main hindrance resides in the market
frictions: regulations, cultural biases, stricter requirements and higher transaction costs.
Motivated by the above arguments, our research hypothesizes that the short-selling risk
may explain a good part of the momentum returns from the loser portfolio, which consists of the
bulk of the abnormal returns from a momentum strategy.

12

Unless the sophisticated investors are willing to incur higher costs, such as asking for a negative rebate rate from
the current owners, as an extreme example.
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Hypothesis 1.Stocks that are most constrained by the short-selling risk generate the lowest
momentum returns from the loser portfolio.
This hypothesis derives from the argument that the behavior of the stocks with the most
severe short-selling constraints will prevent more pessimistic information from quickly being
reflected in the price. Thus, the losers will be more severely overpriced, and the returns will
be significantly lower.

Hypothesis 2.The short-selling risk independently and significantly explains the momentum
returns from the loser portfolio.
If the short-selling risk is able to independently and significantly explain the returns of
the losers in the momentum strategy, then the continued bad performance of the past losers
indicates that the past losers are overpriced due to the limits of short-selling. Otherwise, the
prices of the past losers would be lower in the first place because the investors can sell them
short and put enough downward pressure on their prices. Alternatively, the momentum
abnormal returns can be explained as a compensation of the market frictions, the short-selling
risk, for the loser portfolio. These results will also provide additional insight to the long debated
conjecture, first raised by Miller (1977), that the short-selling constraints in a market of
heterogeneous beliefs will cause stock overpricing.

Hypothesis 3. NASDAQ stocks are less short-selling constrained than are NYSE & AMEX stocks.
This difference may explain the long-observed phenomenon that momentum abnormal returns
become much smaller when NASDAQ stocks are included.
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There is strong empirical evidence that the inclusion of NASDAQ stocks in the
momentum strategy leads to a drastic reduction in the momentum abnormal returns. This
hypothesis is supported by the argument of some researchers (Bai, 2007) that the short-selling
constraints in the NASDAQ are less severe than those in the NYSE and AMEX.

Question 1. Given the proxy for the short-selling constraints, we can directly check the
effectiveness of the tick and bid tests in the NYSE and NASDAQ markets.
To gather data and thoroughly study the effect of the tick and bid tests on market
volatility, price efficiency and liquidity, the SEC implemented a pilot program from May 2, 2005,
to July 3, 2007. This pilot program suspended the uptick rule on one third of the Russell 3000
Index constituent stocks with high levels of liquidity. On July 3, 2007, the SEC finally abolished
Rule 10a-1 and any rule of exchanges, including NASDAQ 3350, which applied a bid test on
short sales (Bai, 2007). Therefore, the pilot program provides a convenient platform to check
whether the tick and bid tests in the NYSE and NASDAQ markets are effective price restrictions.
Several studies, such as Bai (2007) and Reg. SHO Pilot Report (2007), have failed to find
any significant difference in the short interests of both markets across the pilot and control stocks,
despite the price tests. In addition, neither of the two studies mentioned above found any
evidence that the price tests were able to reduce the speed of price decline or overpricing in the
pilot program.

V. Data and Methodology
The data on stock returns are collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) Monthly Stock File for NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks. Throughout the study,
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closed-end funds, American Depository Receipts (ADR), real estate investment trusts (REIT),
and primes and scores13 are excluded. The short interest data come from two sources. The
majority of them are obtained from the Bloomberg database from January 1, 1988 to February 29,
2008. The data were backfilled in June, 2008 to update for ticker changes, delisting, and
acquisitions. The rest of them are obtained from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database. The
short interest data contain most of the companies that are listed in the CRSP. The variable of
short interest is the total number of shares investors have sold short but have not yet bought back.
The short interest ratio (SIR) is the total number of shares an investor has sold short divided by
the shares outstanding for a specific month14.
Data on institutional holdings are extracted from the Thomson Financial Institutional
Holdings (13F) database. The quarterly holdings start in the first quarter of 1988 and end in the
last quarter of 2007. The shares of institutional ownership are calculated by summing up the
stock holdings owned by all reporting institutions for each stock in each quarter. Following
Gompers and Metrick (2001), stocks that are on CRSP but without any institutional holdings are
assumed to have zero institutional ownership. We also exclude the observations with institutional
ownership greater than 100 percent, which are subject to double counting problem. As
mentioned in the user’s guide of Thomson Financial database, the spectrum’s records of late
filings reflect stock splits that have occurred between the report date and the filing date, some
even reflect stock splits after the filing date. The longest gap between the report date and filing
date is two years. This inconsistency makes the data hard to compare among late filers and on13

Americus Trust Components that are created by repackaging certain common stocks into a five-year warrant unit
for the underlying stocks (scores) and a five-year holding unit of the stocks but with a covered call (primes).
14
This paper uses short interest to shares outstanding ratio by following Asquith et al. (2005) paper’s argument that
short interest to shares outstanding ratio is a better measure in reflecting the information of informed investors than
the traditional
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time filers. Therefore, following Nagel (2005), the institutional holdings (13F) database is
unadjusted for stock splits which occur between the report and filling dates. Institutional
ownership (IOS) used in this study is the quotient of the institutional ownership for each
company and its corresponding shares outstanding.
Market-to-book ratio (MB), analyst forecast dispersion (ADISP), firm-level volatility
(VOL), turnover for current month (TURN) and previous month (lagTURN), Liquidity (LIQ),
firm size (logSZ) and its squared form (logSZSQ), stock return for current month (RET) and
previous month (lagRET) and option status (CALL and PUT) are also used to estimate the latent
shorting demand.
The book value of equity is defined as common equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes
and is obtained from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database. For each month, the market-tobook ratio is calculated as the quotient of the market value of equity at month t divided by the
most recent fiscal year-end book value of equity that is at least six months ahead of month t. If
the book value of equity is negative, the market-to-book ratio is set to missing.
As in most studies, analyst forecast dispersion (ADISP) is obtained from the Institutional
Brokers Estimates System (I/B/E/S). It is the standard deviation of current fiscal year earnings
per share forecasts scaled by the absolute value of mean earnings forecasts, for each month from
January 1988 to December 2007. Since the I/B/E/S data have a rounding problem related to
stock splits, the unadjusted summary data in I/B/E/S are used.
Firm-level volatility (VOL) is the standard deviation of a firm’s monthly stock returns
over the last 12 months. Firm size (logSZ) is the log form of market capitalization. We also
include the squared logSZ to capture the possibility of a nonlinear relationship.
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Turnover (TURN) is the monthly ratio of trading volume divided by the number of shares
outstanding from CRSP. LagTURN is the turnover of the previous month. As pointed by Atkins
and Dyl (1997), the dealer market, NASDAQ double counts the buys and sells from the dealers.
Therefore, to make the stock turnover comparable within all exchanges, we followed Nagel
(2005) and divided the stock turnover from NASDAQ by two.
Liquidity (LIQ) is obtained from Liquidity factors in WRDS. This variable is derived by
Sadak in his 2006 paper, and is extracted monthly from January 1988 to December 2005.
According to Sadak, 2006, firm-level liquidity is decomposed into variable and fixed price
effects. Liquidity is the variable or permanent part of price effects. It is a non-traded, marketwide, undiversifiable risk factor that is priced in the momentum portfolio returns.
Call and Put are monthly data obtained from Bloomberg. They are all call or put option
contracts (all strike prices and expiration dates) outstanding for a particular security. These two
variables are scaled by shares outstanding in units of thousands.

5.1. Summary Statistics
Table 5 presents the summary statistics for the short interest ratio (SIR), institutional
ownership (IOS) and predictor variables for the actual shorting demand (SID): MB, ADSIP,
VOL, TURN (lagTURN), RET (lagRET), logSZ (logSZSQ), LIQ, CALL and PUT. The sample
period for the final dataset ran from January, 1988 to December, 2005.
Panel A indicates the mean and median values of the above variables. It is worth noting
that there is a significant difference between the mean and median values of the SIR. Although
most of the stocks have very small short interest throughout the period (the 90 percentile of SIR
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is less than 6.42%), 0.47% of the SIR observations were larger than 1. These observations
sharply increased the mean value. From 1988 to 1990, the short interest was so sparse that
almost no short interest was observed; this interval was clearly different from the later years in
the period. We do not know whether data are missing or whether there were simply no short
sales for those three years. The average numbers of firms per month indicate that the sample
sizes for the different variables were quite different. In particular, CALL and PUT obtained
from the Bloomberg database only have average cross-sectional sample sizes of 1297 and 1284
firms, respectively, which represent approximately one-third of the sample sizes for the other
variables. This gap costs a great deduction of data in the later analysis.
All of the correlation coefficients were calculated cross-sectionally for each month and
then averaged throughout the whole time period in panel B. Because LIQ is a yearly datum
without cross-sectional variation, it is excluded in panel B. TURN, CALL and PUT are strongly
correlated with each other, with pairwise correlation coefficients ranging from 0.4055 to 0.8367.
This result indicates that when the equity market is trading actively, the option market
corresponds. The very high correlation between CALL and PUT may result from divergent
opinions in the market or from option trading strategies. The variable SIR is strongly correlated
with the variables CALL, PUT, TURN, IOS, and logSZ, with pairwise correlation coefficients
ranging from 0.1263 to 0.5697. These correlations indicate that short sales are more active when
equity and option markets are more active. As a variable IOS is a proxy for the potential supply
of loanable stocks, the positive correlation between SIR and IOS indicates that stocks with
greater institutional holdings tend be shorted more easily. This finding is consistent with extant
literature that stock supply is a necessary but not sufficient condition for short sales and that
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institutional holdings are very important source of supply. Similar to the finding of Nagel (2005),
the variables IOS and logSZ exhibited a strong positive correlation, at a level of 0.6625.

5.2. Pooled Interval Regression and the True Demand for Shorting
If short-selling constraints do exist in the market, then the short interest ratio we observed
was a distorted demand measure with some of the shorting demand suppressed by the shortselling constraints. Therefore, instead of being a proxy for the shorting demand, it only revealed
partial demand or realized demand. The more short-selling is constrained, the more shorting
demand is suppressed and the less realized shorting demand is reflected. The difference between
the realizable demand and the realized demand is the short-selling constraints quantified in the
number of shares that could not be shorted by the short-sellers.
Because the observed short interest ratio reflects the constrained demand, it is always the
lower bound of the realizable shorting demand. That is, the realizable shorting demand is always
equal to or greater than the reflected short interest ratio, depending on the extent of the shortselling constraints. Asquith et al (2005) discovered that, on a firm-by-firm basis over the entire
time period of 1980-2002, 95% of their sample stocks in an average month had institutional
ownership greater than the short interest. This finding means that, for 95% of the data, the
availability of the stock is not a constraint that hinders short sales. Therefore, our study used the
institutional ownership as a conservative upper bound for the realizable shorting demand.
However, the use of this conservative upper bound meant that one short-selling constraint, stock
availability from the institutional investors, was ignored. This factor means that the actual shortselling constraints should be equal to (or even higher than) the estimated short-selling constraints,
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as long as the stock falls in the 5% cases in which the stock availability from institutional
investors cannot be satisfied and acts as another short-selling constraint. Using this theoretical
design, the realizable shorting demand belongs to the category of interval data with the observed
short interest ratio as the lower bound and the institutional ownership as the conservative upper
bound.
Interval regression is a generalization of the censored-normal-regression and the tobit
models. Unlike the tobit model, which requires one threshold censoring value for all of the
observations, the interval regression allows the censoring values to vary from observation to
observation. Although the censored-normal-regression provides the varying censoring values, it
only allows for three options: not censored (0), right-censored (+1) or left-censored (-1).
Therefore, among these three possible models, the interval regression best fits the short-selling
data for cases in which the censoring value fluctuates for each observation and, at the same time,
the true values are bounded by an interval.
Interval regression can fit models for data in which each observation represents interval
data, left-censored data, right-censored data, or point data. Specifically, interval regression fits a
model of y = [depvar1, depvar2] on independent variables, where the y for each observation is
either point data, interval data, left-censored data, or right-censored data (Stata Reference Book,
p. 506). Depvar1 and depvar2 should have the following form:
Type of data
Point data

depvar1
a

depvar2
a

a = [a, a]

Interval data

[a, b]

a

b

Left-censored data

(-∞, b]

.

b

Right-censored data

[a, +∞ )

a

.
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If we know that the value for Jth individual is somewhere in the interval [y1j, y2j], then the
likelihood contribution from this individual is simply Pr (

) for right-censored data, where

≤

). For the censored data,

) for left-censored data and

their likelihoods contain terms of the form Pr (
Pr (

≤

is the observed censoring value and

denotes the

random variable representing the dependent variable in the model.
This study utilized pooled interval regression with cluster robust errors. Pooled interval
regression treats the whole sample as a long cross section of size N*T. Cluster robust errors
were used to catch the potential correlation of the dependent variable within a cluster (i.e., an
individual firm in this study), possibly through unobserved cluster effects.
The linear interval regression model with cluster effects is specified as
for i=1… N, t=1… T, where
(
is

,

is the error term. The observed data consist of the couples

), such that
∑ log Ф

,

. The log likelihood function to estimate the coefficients
∗

Ф

∗

. The advantage of pooled interval regression is

that, with T fixed and N approaching infinity, the pooled interval estimator is consistent and √ is asymptotically normal without any assumptions that are required for fixed and random effect
panel data regressions, other than identification and standard regularity conditions. For example,
the pooled interval estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal even under the following
conditions: the error terms are arbitrarily serially correlated, the dynamics are not correctly
specified, and the independent variables are not strictly exogenous (Wooldridge, Econometric
Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data). Our data satisfy the conditions for T and N: a large
number of clusters N and a relatively small group size T. However, the usual standard errors and
test statistics reported from a pooled analysis are not valid, and robust versions should be
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adopted to make the inferences in the pooled interval regression robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and cluster correlation. The following corrected asymptotic covariance matrix
is used when the observations occurring in groups may be correlated.
∑

∑

∑

′

.

.

, where V is the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix and

is the vector of derivatives of the log likelihood for observation i in cluster j. V =
[∑

∑

∑

(Stata Reference Book)

VI. Estimated Realizable Shorting Demand and Short-selling Constraints
This section presents the results of the pooled interval regression, analyzes the
determinants of the realizable shorting demand, and derives the short-selling constraints that will
be used to explain the abnormal returns from the momentum strategy. Through our research
design, we will use institutional ownership as a conservative upper bound to estimate the
realizable shorting demand. Therefore, we will only focus on a subset of the database:
observations with a short interest ratio less than or equal to the institutional ownership.

6.1. Short Interest Ratio and Institutional Ownership
Figure 1 plots the time series of monthly short interest data and quarterly institutional
ownership data with all the observations over the period of January, 1988 to December, 2005.
Three ratios are reported in the chart: the median and 95th percentile of the SIR and the median
of the IOS. The figure indicates that 1) over the whole period, the level of short interest ratio
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maintains a very low profile, well below 5%; 2) the 95th percentile of the short interest ratio
exhibited a similar pattern to the median of the institutional ownership, indicating that these two
ratios are probably connected closely through some mechanism, for example, institutional
ownership is an important source of loanable shares for short sales; 3) the median values of
institutional ownership are many times larger than those of the short interest ratio throughout the
whole time period; and 4) even the 95th percentile of short interest ratio was significantly less
than the median of institutional ownership for almost all of the entire period, with the exception
of two months: November and December, 1990. This finding implies that, as an important
source of loanable stocks for short sales, institutional ownership can satisfy the majority of
shorting demand and is a legitimate upper bound for the realizable shorting demand when
making conservative assumptions.
Finally, about 4.97% of the data with short-interest ratio larger than the institutional
ownership were dropped to estimate the pooled interval regression model. This result confirms
the findings of Asquith et al (2005) that only 5% of the institutional ownership was less than the
short interest ratio in the whole sample over the entire time span. However, it is still worthwhile
to investigate whether the firms being dropped have certain special characteristics that
distinguish them from the retained firms. Table 6 compares the summary statistics between the
two groups: those with a short interest ratio larger than the corresponding institutional ownership
and those with a short interest ratio no larger than the corresponding institutional ownership.
Two-sample t-tests were calculated to identify the differences between the two groups15.
The results indicate that the two groups have statistically different characteristics at the 1%
significance level. Compared to the “SIR IOS” group, the “SIR>IOS” group stocks are
15

Wilcoxon rank-sum tests on medians derive similar results.
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glamour stocks with smaller sizes and higher past returns. They have more heterogeneous
opinions, as indicated by the higher analyst forecast dispersion, the higher past 12-month return
volatility, and the higher turnover. They also have more active secondary option markets, as
reflected by the higher call and put open interest. The short interest in the “SIR>IOS” group was
higher, which also occurs when the market liquidity risk is lower. For IOS, 52.67% of the
observations in the “SIR>IOS” group are the ones with assigned value of 0 when the
observations were not available in the Thomson Financial Institutional Holdings (13F) database.
Therefore, when there are values for short interest ratio, no matter how large they are, they
exceed its corresponding institutional ownership. Those 0 institutional ownership observations
(number=16675) pull the median of IOS down to 0 in the “SIR>IOS” group. However, even if
those 0 institutional ownership observations are excluded, the IOS median (0.0199)16 is still
significantly smaller than that of the “SIR<IOS” group (0.3468). Given the higher short interest,
and lower institutional ownership and the active trading (both in the stock and option markets),
those stocks should rely more on individual investors for short sales. Due to the different
characteristics of the “SIR>IOS” group, we should be cautious about applying the later results in
this category, which was excluded from the regression model in the first place.

6.2. Estimated Interval Regression Model
Stock return, liquidity, dispersion of opinions, and option markets have been well
documented in previous research as determinants of shorting demand.

16

The summary statistics of the subgroup without 0 institutional ownership observations in the “SIR>IOS” category
are not shown in the Table II.
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RET, lagRET, and MB are return indicators. Short-sellers can only profit when there is a
potential overpricing or predicted future price downturn. So they will short more when current
or past return indicators are high. Diether et al. (2008) found that short-selling activity was
strongly positively related to past returns. D’Avolio (2002) found that glamour stocks, i.e.,
stocks with high market-to-book ratios, increased the borrowing cost and the likelihood of being
special. Therefore, a high market-to-book ratio should decrease the shorting demand.
VOL, TURN and ADSIP are proxies for differences of opinion or valuation dissonance.
D’Avolio (2002) found that stocks with high turnover have a higher probability of being special.
However, he was unable to find any statistically significant relationship between analyst
dispersion and the borrowing cost of the stocks.
Liquidity affects stock returns and, thus, shorting demand. LIQ, TURN, and logSZ are
liquidity indicators. Besides the new role of serving as the proxy for differences of opinion,
stock turnover has been a traditional proxy for liquidity. Both Datar et al. (1998) and Brennan et
al. (1998) documented that stocks with a high trading volume tended to earn lower future returns.
Hence, a high trading volume should boost the demand to short if it is a proxy for liquidity rather
than for valuation dissonance. LIQ is the market-wide liquidity risk, developed by Sadka (2006),
which was found to be priced in the cross-sectional variation of stock returns. Our study is the
first to utilize this undiversifiable risk factor for measuring the shorting demand. It is also
commonly believed that stocks of large firms are more liquid with less information asymmetry,
factors that should facilitate short sales.
Option markets are closely related to the stock markets. Option trading may facilitate or
substitute for short sales. Figlewski and Webb (1993) indicated that optioned stocks were more
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heavily shorted than non-optioned stocks and that option introductions coincide with increased
short-selling of the underlying stock.
Specifically, in our study, the pooled interval regression can be expressed as
∗
∗
,

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗
∗

∗
∗

∗

.
The pooled interval regression was run from January, 1988 to December, 2005. The

dependent variable was the latent shorting demand, which is bounded within the interval in
which the actual short interest was the lower limit and the institutional ownership was a
conservative upper limit. The standard errors were adjusted for the cluster effect. The first
column of Table 7 lists all of the independent variables. The likelihood-ratio chi-squared test
gauges the difference between the full model (with predictors) and the constant only model. The
chi-squared test indicates that the whole model was statistically significant at the 1% level. All
of the coefficients were significant at the 1% level. All of the observations in the regression had
unequal lower and upper bounds. The McFadden’s adjusted R-square was 0.235. Among the
total of 135,116 predicted values, 1,787 observations (1.323 percent) were left censored and took
on the value of the short interest ratio (i.e., the lower bound) and 4,117 observations (3.047
percent) were right censored and took on the value of the institutional ownership (i.e., the upper
bound). The remaining 129,212 observations (95.630 percent) were censored. This result
indicates that the majority of stocks are subject to short-selling constraints and that the actual
shorting demand is higher than the observed short interest ratio.
Among the return indicators in Table 7, both the return and the past month return were
positively related to the shorting demand. Therefore, short-selling is a contrarian sign, and
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investors sell short to take advantage of potential price downturn or current overpricing. The
market-to-book ratio was negatively related to the shorting demand. When the market-to-book
ratio is high, the market has a high expectation of the earning power of the firm, which signifies
that the stock price will increase in the future. This information decreases the demand for
shorting.
The differences of opinion proxies indicated different impacts on the shorting demand.
The analyst forecast dispersion variable indicated that, when there is a discrepancy in the
security values, the investors become less likely to short. This phenomenon can be associated
with higher shorting costs and more trading risks because when the stock value is unclear, the
borrowing costs and the probability of premature short squeeze risk are higher. Similarly, the
past 12-month return volatility variable displayed a negative coefficient of -0.1743, indicating
that the short-sellers were more reluctant to sell short when there was more disagreement about
the stock intrinsic value in the recent period. Because short sales are riskier than the long
position, a volatile market makes short-sellers cautious.
However, the stock trading volumes in both the current and past periods showed a clearly
positive relationship. This positive relationship was exactly opposite from the negative
implication given by the other proxies for valuation controversy (i.e., analyst forecast dispersion
and the past 12-month return volatility), implying that if investors disagree about the intrinsic
value of the stocks, they tend to sell short less. This contradiction can be explained by the proxy
role of turnover. Turnover is more of a proxy for liquidity rather than for the valuation
controversy among investors. Consequently, the positive relationship between turnover and
shorting demand makes sense. More liquid stocks cost less to short and, ceteris paribus, increase
the shorting demand. Our results on turnover also matched with the previous finding of both
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Datar et al. (1998) and Brennan et al. (1998) that stocks with high trading volume have low
future returns. Thus, higher turnover can trigger an increased demand to short. Therefore, even
though turnover can reflect both liquidity and differences of opinion, our study indicates that it
predominantly plays the former role.
The liquidity factor (LIQ) is a measure that was described in a Sadka (2006) paper. It is
defined as the price-impact induced by trades and is separated into fixed (transitory) and variable
(permanent) price effects. The permanent change in the stock price is associated with a change
in its perceived intrinsic value through the information effect and is dependent on the amounts of
both informed and noise trading. LIQ has a positive effect on the shorting demand. When it is
more likely that the pessimistic information will be permanently embedded into the stock price,
the shorting demand increases. This effect implies that short-sellers are informed traders. They
tend to catch the correct timing to short and avoid short squeeze risk. In the risk perspective,
when there is less noise trading in the market, short sales are less risky, and the shorting demand
increases. Size has a quadratic effect on the shorting demand. The shorting demand increases
for the stocks of large firms, as large firm stocks typically attract more attention in the media and
reduce the information asymmetry. At the same time, large firm stocks are typically more liquid,
as more institutional investors hold them. Consequently, it is easier and less costly for investors
to find stock loans for large firm stocks and sell them short. However, when the firm size is very
large, the shorting demand decreases. One possible reason for this phenomenon is that a very
large firm typically has a high market price, which increases the costs to short (such as the
margin requirement).
The option market (both call and put) facilitates short sales. Stocks that are call or put
option-enabled are more likely to boost the short sales. This result is also supported by evidence
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from Figlewski and Webb (1993) that optioned stocks are more heavily shorted than nonoptioned stocks. They explain this phenomenon by stating that when a put is purchased from an
option maker, the market maker will normally hedge by shorting the stock and/or buying a call to
reverse the position. Diether et al. (2008) provided additional evidence for this explanation for
the call option. Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) also found that, not only do call-only option
listings increase the short interest, but joint put-call listings produce greater increases in short
interest. This finding matches the observations from our study. From the liquidity perspective,
stocks with an active option market should also have an active stock market; both of these
features indicate a more liquid market for trading and an easier environment for shorting.

6.3. Short-selling Constraints
After we estimate the latent shorting demand, the difference between the realizable and
the realized shorting demand yield a new proxy for short-selling constraints.
Figure 2 indicates the monthly median values of the short interest ratio (SIR),
institutional ownership (IOS), realizable shorting demand (SID), and short-selling constraints
(SC). The realizable shorting demand is the censored predicted values from the pooled interval
regression model. They are left censored at the short interest ratio when they are smaller than the
lower bound, and right censored at the institutional ownership when they are greater than the
upper bound. The short-selling constraints (SC) were derived as the difference of the latent
shorting demand and the realized shorting demand, in other words, the difference between the
predicted realizable shorting demand (SID) and the short interest ratio (SIR). Because the option
data were all missing before September, 1995, the predicted shorting demand and the short-
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selling constraints data start at September, 1995. Over the entire period, the short-selling
constraints remained at a stable level, even from 1995 to 2000, when institutional holding
fluctuated greatly and after 2000, when the market shares of the institutional investors increased
dramatically. This result indicates that the stock supply is only one of the factors that impact
short-selling activities and that most of the times it is not binding. The mean and median of the
predicted realizable shorting demand with censoring are 0.2333 and 0.2315. The short-selling
constraints have a mean of 0.1861 and a median of 0.1982. Clearly, most of the shorting demand
was suppressed for some reason, and only a small fraction of the actual shorting demand was
realized. This finding matches with the suggestion of the literature that short interest has been
unbelievably low over time.

VII. Short-selling Constraints and Momentum Abnormal Returns
After deriving the short-selling constraints (SC), this section presents tests of Hypotheses
1-2, which predict that stocks with more severe short-selling constraints generate lower returns.
Hence, short-selling constraints can explain the abnormal returns in the loser portfolio from the
momentum strategy, which also constitute the majority of the total momentum abnormal returns.

7.1. Portfolio Sorts on Short-selling Constraints
In Table 8, the stocks are sorted at the end of each month t into three short-selling
constraints groups. As indicated by Panel A, strong variation is seen in short-selling constraints
across the three groups. The time-series averages of the cross-sectional means and medians of
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short-selling constraints monotonically increase from a mean of 0.1281 and a median of 0.1438
in the low group to a mean of 0.2329 and a median of 0.2260 in the high group.
In Panels B-H, we double-sort the portfolio by the short-selling constraints (SC),
conditional on the independent sort of market-to-book ratio (MB), size (logSZ), past 12-month
return volatility (VOL), analyst forecast dispersion (ADISP), turnover (TURN), call open interest
(CALL), and put open interest (PUT). At the end of each month, a portfolio is formed based on
a double-sorting of the past 6 months’ mean values of the above variables, with a holding period
of six months. Hence, the holding periods are overlapping and one sixth of the portfolio is
rebalanced every month, as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Returns in each portfolio are
equally weighted and they are reported in decimal points per month.
Panel B presents the MB results. As the market-to-book ratio increases, the stock returns
decrease in all subgroups within the same level of the short-selling constraints. This finding
indicates that glamour stocks tend to sell at relatively high price-to-earnings ratios, and thus, they
tend to earn smaller returns relative to value stocks. Within each subgroup sorted on the marketto-book ratio, stocks with stronger short-selling constraints tend to be more overpriced and earn
smaller returns. For example, in the subgroup with a low market-to-book ratio, the most shortselling constrained group earns a low return of only 1.29% and the much higher return of 1.88%
in the least short-selling constrained group. This difference is significant at the 5% level, after
controlling for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Hypothesis I predicts that stocks that are
most constrained by the short-selling risk generate the smallest returns. As indicated by the table,
this prediction is borne out remarkably well. More importantly, the prediction holds when the
market-to-book ratio (a factor that is widely believed to affect stock returns) is controlled at
different levels. Therefore, the explanatory power of the short-selling constraints is valid and
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independent of the market-to-book ratio in explaining the cross-sectional stock return
predictability.
The strikingly similar pattern we see in the MB results also appears in other predictors.
Panel C demonstrates the return patterns based on double-sorting according to the firm size and
the short-selling constraints. Even after sorting by the firm size, the stock returns still clearly
decrease as the short-selling constraints increase. The stock return in the SC1 group is only 1.15%
for the low firm size group, and reaches as high as 1.48% for the least constrained group. This
pattern reinforces Hypothesis 1 that the stocks that are most constrained by the short-selling risk
generate the lowest returns. Short-selling constraints still show an independent power for
explaining the cross-sectional return variations, after controlling for the size effects.
Panel D also displays a very similar pattern as the previous return predictors. When the
past 12-month return volatility data are sorted, short-selling constraints still cause the stock
returns to decrease across the SC groups. For example, when the past return volatility is high,
the stock return drops from 1.17% in the SC3 group (the least constrained group) to 0.37% in the
SC1 group (the most constrained group). This drop is statistically significant at the 5% level.
This finding further supports Hypothesis 1 that the more short-selling constrained stocks are
subject to more overpricing and tend to provide lower returns. Therefore, when the stock market
is more volatile or there is more controversy about the intrinsic value of a stock in the past, the
short-sellers tend to be more reluctant to sell short to avoid more risk, which translates into more
overpriced stocks and lower stock returns. Therefore, past return volatility and short-selling
constraints have individual explanatory powers in stock return variations.
Panel E reports the stock return variations after a double-sorting of the analyst forecast
dispersion and the short-selling constraints. This panel is important because it directly tests the
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long-debated hypothesis proposed by Miller (1977) that short-selling constraints in a market of
heterogeneous beliefs will cause stock overpricing. However, stocks with the highest degree of
heterogeneous beliefs did not display the largest return differences when the short-selling
constraints increased from the lowest group to the highest. In the group with the most
heterogeneous beliefs (the P1 group), the stock returns showed a clearly increasing pattern as the
short-selling constraints decreased. Therefore, stocks with more short-selling constraints were
possibly overpriced, even after controlling for the extent of heterogeneous beliefs in the market,
which is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, this pattern exists in other groups with
different levels of valuation controversy.
Panel F indicates that Hypothesis 1 is still very significant when the portfolio is doublesorted by turnover and short-selling constraints. The stock return in SC1 is lower than that in
SC3, given the same level of stock turnover. For example, given a low level of turnover, the
stock return is 1.08% in the most short-selling constrained group but is as large as 1.53% in the
least constrained group.
Panels G and H again indicate the persistent and independent explanatory power of shortselling constraints in predicting cross-sectional stock returns. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, the
stocks that are most severely short-selling constrained earn the lowest return in all the subgroups
ranked by call (put) open interest. For instance, the stocks with high call or put open interest
earned a return of 0.96% in Panel G and 0.95% in Panel H in the most short-selling constrained
group. However, they earned as high as 1.70% in Panel G and 1.52% in Panel H when they were
in the least short-selling constrained group.
Therefore, the above double-sorting analysis demonstrates a clear and strong pattern that
stock returns decrease as short-selling constraints become more severe while holding one of the
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controlling variables constant. This cross-sectional variation verifies the first hypothesis that the
stocks that are most constrained by short-selling risk generate the lowest returns. Short-selling
constraints have a strong and independent explanatory power for predicting cross-sectional stock
returns.

7.2. Momentum Strategy and Short-selling Constraints
Now we investigate the momentum returns from the loser portfolio and a modified
momentum strategy directly.
Table 9 displays monthly returns to a modified momentum strategy based on a single
sorting of the past 6 months’ short-selling constraints (SC), instead of the past returns in Panel A,
and a double-sorting of the short-selling constraints, conditional on the past 6 months’ returns in
Panel B. Panel A shows a strongly increasing pattern in the stock returns as the short-selling
constraints decrease. Therefore, short-selling constraints offer predictability for stock returns.
This is consistent with Hypothesis 1 that stocks with more short-selling constraints are more
overpriced and thus predict lower returns. The stocks in Panel A in the SC1 group generated a
low return of 0.82%, which gradually increased to 1.40% in the least short-selling constrained
group. The raw return in this modified momentum strategy was 0.58%.
In Panel B, the momentum strategy first ranks the stocks based on the past 6 months’
geometric returns. The stocks with the highest past returns were the winners, and those with the
lowest past returns were the losers. According to Hypothesis 1, within the loser portfolio, further
sorting on short-selling constraints should still have independent explanatory power in the
portfolio returns. Panel B indicates a strong return pattern not only in the loser portfolio but also
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in the other return groups. The stocks in the most short-selling constrained group provided the
lowest returns. In the loser portfolio, the most short-selling constrained stocks only earned an
average of 0.77%, which increased to 1.32% when the short-selling constraints were mildest.
This finding directly supports Hypothesis 1 that short-selling constraints do cause the return
predictability in the momentum strategy, even after controlling for past returns.

7.3. Risk Adjustments
Table 10 provides insights on the sources of abnormal returns from the momentum
strategy. Specifically, it explores the importance of short-selling constraints for generating the
abnormal returns from the momentum strategy. In this table, four models are compared to
explain the momentum abnormal returns: the well-established Fama-French three-factor model,
our modified four-factor model with short-selling constraints included as the additional factor,
the Carhart four-factor model, and our modified five-factor model with short-selling constraints
as the fifth factor. The Fama-French three-factor model is recognized as the most efficient and
powerful model for explaining the cross-sectional variation of average stock returns. If our
modified four-factor model significantly improves the explanatory power of the three-factor
model, then the fourth factor does capture the additional variation of the portfolio returns that is
missed by the three-factor model. Similarly, if short-selling constraints (SC) variable is added
into the Carhart four-factor model and keeps significant with the presence of momentum factor,
then short-selling constraints (SC) does have additional explanatory power that supplements the
momentum factor in explaining the returns from the momentum strategy.
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First, we run the following time-series regression using the monthly portfolio returns
from the momentum strategy, in excess of risk-free rate in Panel A:
∗

∗

. Here,

=

∗

is the monthly average portfolio returns;

is

the monthly Treasury bill rate (i.e., the risk-free interest rate) obtained from WRDS,
(MKTRF) is the monthly Fama-French excess return on the market, SMB is the monthly FamaFrench small firm factor, and HML is the monthly Fama-French book-to-market (value) factor.
The momentum strategy is a (6,0,6) strategy, which sorts the portfolio based on the past 6 month
returns and holds the portfolio for 6 months without skipping. P0 represent the returns from the
winner portfolio, P2 represent the returns from the loser portfolio, and P0-P2 represents the
return differences between the winner and loser portfolios (i.e., the total momentum returns).
In all of the return groups, only two of the estimated intercept coefficients from these
regressions are significantly different from zero. The explanatory power of the Fama-French
three-factor model is highest in the winner portfolio, with an adjusted R-square as high as
91.86%. The explanatory power of the model decrease to 69.41% in the loser portfolio. The
total momentum return is least explained by the three-factor model at 10.05%. Clearly the threefactor model explains the winner stocks much better than the loser stocks, probably because it
was unable to catch some risk factor that affected the loser stocks predominantly. Two variables
were consistently significant in the three-factor model. One was MKTRF, the market excess
returns, and the other was SMB, which mimics return for the size factor. These results indicate
that the market risk and size difference across firms do capture strong common variation in stock
returns.
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To investigate the additional explanatory power of short-selling constraints beyond the
well-established Fama-French three factors, Panel B runs the same Fama-French three-factor
model as above but includes short-selling constraints (SC) as an additional factor. The shortselling constraints (SC) were constructed largely following the Carhart (1997) method for
obtaining the momentum factor, which was calculated as the return difference of the 3 equallyweighted portfolios formed by sorting the past six months’ short-selling constraints. The
portfolios were reformed monthly.
As with the three-factor model, the explanatory power of the four-factor model also
decreased from the winner portfolio to the loser portfolio and was lowest in the total momentum
return portfolio. It is not surprising that the three-factor model had low explanatory power in the
total momentum return portfolio because it was the model for cross-sectional stock returns.
However, the most revealing phenomenon was that, while the adjusted R-squares for the winner
and intermediate portfolios stay almost unchanged in the four-factor model, the explanatory
power of the four-factor model for the loser portfolio increased by 8%, from 69.41% to 77.42%,
after the short-selling constraints factor was added in. Furthermore, the short-selling constraints
factor was very significant in the loser portfolio at the 1% level but was not significant in the
winner and intermediate portfolios. These results clearly verify our previous understanding that
the short-selling constraint is a risk factor that predominantly affects the loser portfolio. The
modified four-factor model with short-selling constraints does capture additional risk loading
that the well-established Fama-French three-factor model was unable to pick up. The four-factor
model also greatly increased the explanatory power in the total momentum returns, from 10.05%
to 31.78%. These 21% increase of the adjusted R-square strongly indicated again that the short-
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selling constraints factor in our modified four-factor model captured additional risk loading and
better explained the momentum abnormal returns.
The Carhart four-factor model was also compared with our five-factor model with shortselling constraints added in as the fifth explaining factor. The Carhart four-factor model greatly
increased the explaining power of the Fama-French three-factor model. It explained the
momentum returns much better than the three-factor model and raised the adjusted R-square
from 10.05% to as high as 84.90%. The fourth factor, the momentum factor, was also highly
significant in all of the regressions. When the short-selling constraints (SC) were added in, the
explaining power of the five model still increased; however, the increase was small
(approximately 1%). More interestingly, even with the presence of the momentum factor, the
short-selling constraint variable was still significant in the loser portfolio regression and the
momentum return regression. The significance level of the momentum factor also decreased
considerably, which may imply that some of the explanatory power in the momentum factor was
absorbed by the short-selling constraints. This result indicates that the short-selling constraints
have independent explanatory power and can capture some risk loading that the momentum
factor does not capture. Also, the loser portfolio stocks are much more sensitive than the
winners in to reflecting such risk loading.
All of these model comparisons indicate that the short-selling constraint has persistent
and independent explanatory power for explaining the returns from the momentum strategy.
A new proxy for the short-squeeze risk was also developed and added into the FamaFrench three-factor model and the Carhart four-factor model. The short-squeeze risk has proxies
in four different measures. SIR/(IOS-SIR) and SIR/(1-SIR) measure the ratio of short interest
and available stock loans. When the ratios are small, the availability of the loanable stocks is
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higher, so the short squeeze risk is lower. The difference in the denominator of these two
measures represents the difference between the stock loans available in the whole market and the
proportion that is provided by the institutional investors. The results of adding in the shortsqueeze risk to the Fama-French three-factor model and the Carhart four-factor model were
similar for both of the two measures, indicating that the institutional investors are indeed the
major providers of the loanable stocks for short sales. The other group of proxies are (IOSSIR)/SIR and (1-SIR)/SIR, to include the situation when short interest ratio is larger than or
equal to the institutional ownership. These two proxies produce similar results to the previous
two proxies. To save space, only the proxy of SIR/(IOS-SIR) results are presented here in Table
11. It should be noted that when IOS is used in the proxy, the explanatory power of the modified
Fama-French three-factor model with short squeeze risk included as the fourth factor greatly
increases. However, if the total number of shares outstanding was used, no improvement was
observed when the short squeeze risk was added in the Fama-French three-factor model. Results
for the short-squeeze risk were very similar to the short-selling constraints variable. Both the
modified Fama-French three-factor model and the modified Carhart model better explain the
momentum returns. The short-squeeze risk also shows independent explanatory power by
remaining significant in the presence of the Fama-French three factors and the momentum factor.
However, the only difference is that the short-squeeze risk does not show an asymmetric feature
in the winner and loser portfolios as the short-selling constraint variable does.
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7.4. NASDAQ Effect
Some previous studies have noticed the phenomenon in the momentum strategy that
including NASDAQ stocks in the portfolio decreases returns from the momentum strategy.
Table 12 compares the returns from the momentum strategies with and without NASDAQ stocks.
The momentum strategy in this table was formed based on the past-six-month returns, then held
for six months without skip. The portfolio was equally divided into ten groups, with P0 as the
winner portfolio with the highest return during the past six months and P10 as the loser portfolio
with the lowest return during the past six months.
In Panel A, the stocks in the pooled interval regression model are included. When the
NASDAQ stocks are included in the momentum strategy, the loser portfolio return increases
from 1.89% to 2.26%. However, the winner portfolio was not affected by the inclusion of
NASDAQ stocks, and the return for the winner portfolio only differed by a negligible amount of
0.05%. The returns of P1-P10 in the momentum strategy with only NYSE and AMEX stocks
was 0.37%, and this number dropped to 0.05% when the NASDAQ stocks were included. This
0.32% drop in P0-P10 came mostly from the return increase in the loser portfolio. In Panel B,
when all of the stocks in the market are included, the above trend is more obvious. In the second
column, the loser portfolio obtained a 0.87% return, and this return increased as high as 1.53%
when NASDAQ stocks were included. This increase of 0.66% was statistically significant at the
1% level. In addition, the P0-P10 yielded 0.78% in the momentum strategy with only NYSE and
AMEX stocks, which was also statistically significant at 1%. However, P0-P10 dropped to only
0.32% when NASDAQ stocks were included, and this drop of 0.46% was very close to being
significant at the 10% level. More importantly, this large drop in the momentum returns again
was mostly due to the increase of returns from the loser portfolio.

106

In sum, we find that the decrease of the momentum raw return comes mostly from the
increase of the loser portfolio returns, as the winner portfolio returns remained relatively stable.
Furthermore, in both panels, the loser portfolio returns increased when the NASDAQ stocks
were included. It is not a simple coincidence. Because the stocks in the NASDAQ are subject to
less severe short-selling constraints, and thus the pessimistic information can be quickly reflected
in the price, the stock returns become higher in the loser portfolio. To verify Hypothesis 3, Table
13 directly investigates the level of short-selling constraints among stocks in the NASDAQ and
the NYSE & AMEX.
First, t-tests were calculated on the characteristics of the two groups of stocks according
to where they are traded. In Table 13, NASDAQ stocks have a mean of 1.97% short interest
ratio, whereas NYSE & AMEX stocks have an average of 2.85% short interest ratio. The short
interest ratio difference between the two groups was 0.88%, which is significantly different from
zero at the 1% level. Therefore, NASDAQ stocks generally have a lower short interest ratio
relative to NYSE & AMEX stocks. However, even though NASDAQ stocks have smaller short
interest ratios, they are less short-selling constrained. According to the t-test on the variable SC,
an average of 16.48% of shares outstanding are short-selling constrained for NASDAQ stocks,
which is 3.78% less than the stocks listed on NYSE & AMEX. This difference is statistically
significant at the 1% level. It can be partially explained by the finding in the Reg. SHO Pilot
Report (2007) that the bid test in the NASDAQ was less restrictive than the tick test in the NYSE.
An OLS regression was also run in Panel B, with short-selling constraints as a dependent
variable and the indicator variable NASDAQ as the only independent variable. NASDAQ is a
binary variable which takes the value one when the stocks are traded in the NASDAQ and
otherwise takes the value zero. The regression result further verifies our conclusion from the t-
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tests from Panel A. Comparing to the stocks traded in the NYSE and AMEX, stocks traded in
the NASDAQ are subject to 3.74% fewer short-selling constraints. This result is statistically
significant at the 1% level.
Therefore, traders in the NASDAQ market encounter fewer constraints on short sales.
This factor allows pessimistic information to flow more easily for the NASDAQ stocks than for
the NYSE & AMEX stocks, which causes the NASDAQ losers to have higher returns in the
momentum strategy relative to the losers in the NYSE & AMEX markets.

7.5. Reg. SHO Pilot Program
In July 2004, the SEC adopted Regulation SHO, which allows the commission to
establish a pilot program to examine the efficacy of the tick and bid tests on short sales in the
NYSE & AMEX and NASDAQ markets. The pilot program exempted one-third of the stocks in
the Russell 3000 Index from all price restrictions at any time, which were named as category A
stocks in the July 28, 2004 pilot order and the “pilot” stocks in our study. The control stocks are
category B and C stocks in the remainder of the Russell 3000 Index. Category B stocks are
exempted from the price tests from 4:15 pm until the open of the consolidated tape the next day
only. Category C stocks have no price tests only from the close of the consolidated tape until the
open of the consolidated tape the next day. Stocks that exist both in the pre-pilot and pilot period
for at least one month, and are in the regression data in Table 14, are included for comparison in
the later analysis. Because the NASDAQ market has a more favorable short-selling environment
than does the NYSE & AMEX markets from Hypothesis 3, this analysis was conducted
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separately for both the listed and the NASDAQ stocks. This distinction also helps distinguish
the effects of the tick test in the NYSE & AMEX and the bid test in the NASDAQ.
According to the SEC’s pilot order, the SEC first excluded 32 stocks that were neither
listed in the NYSE & AMEX nor in the NASDAQ, along with IPOs or spin-offs stocks
commenced after April 30, 2004 from the 2004 Russell 3000. Category A stocks were then
selected by sorting the 2004 Russell 3000 first by the listing market and then by the average
daily dollar volume from June, 2003 through May, 2004, and then within each listing market,
picking every third company starting with the second (Reg. SHO Pilot Report, 2007).
Table 14 provides the summary statistics of the monthly stock characteristics between the
pilot and control samples over the four-month period prior to the start of the pilot program on
May 2, 2005. The data are reported separately in the NYSE & AMEX and the NASDAQ
markets to capture the market differences. Our sample contains 384 listed pilot stocks and 376
listed control stocks in the NYSE & AMEX markets, and 759 pilot stocks and 826 control stocks
in the NASDAQ market. In the listed market, the pilot and control stocks have similar turnover
ratios, short-interest ratios, short-selling constraints, and market-to-book ratios from January,
2005 to April, 2005 (before the initiation of the pilot program). In the NASDAQ market, the
pilot and control stocks have comparable turnover ratios, short-selling constraints, and marketto-book ratios prior to the pilot program, except for the short interest ratios. According to the
two-sample t-test, the pilot group in NASDAQ has a 0.9% greater short-interest ratio than the
control group before the start of the pilot program. Overall, at large, the pilot and control stocks
were comparable in both markets over the pre-pilot period and support the validity of further
comparison over the pilot period.

109

Two kinds of t-tests were used to determine the efficacy of the price tests. Within both
the pilot and control samples, paired t-tests were applied to compare the stock characteristics
before and after the pilot program within each sample. The means of the stock characteristics,
such as the short interest ratio, short-selling constraints, turnover ratio, and market-to-book ratio
were first calculated separately over the pre-pilot and pilot periods in different markets for both
samples. Then, paired t-tests on the different stock characteristics in the different markets were
calculated to detect changes due to the removal of the price tests. However, this paired t-test
method cannot distinguish the effects of market conditions or the time trend over the pre-pilot
and pilot periods from the efficacy of the price tests. To address that concern, two-sample t-tests
were run on the difference of the differences between the pilot and control samples in both
markets. As long as the pilot and control samples are generally well-constructed, this approach
can control for changes in the market conditions or the time trend that are unrelated to the
removal of price tests.
Table 15 reports the results of the comparison between pilot and control stocks using the
above two types of t-tests. In the pilot sample, the listed stocks increase their short-selling
constraints by 0.28% from 21.94% to 22.22%, at a significance level of 5%, after the tick test is
removed. However, the pilot stocks in the NASDAQ exhibit no significant change of shortselling constraints after the removal of the bid test. This finding once again provides support for
our previous finding that the NASDAQ provides a better environment for short transactions and
that the bid test does not pose effective hindrance to short sales in the NASDAQ market. Similar
results are seen in the control sample. While the listed control stocks indicated an increase in
short-selling constraints after the pilot program, the short-selling constraint level of the control
sample in the NASDAQ market kept stable. However, an increase in the short-selling constraint
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level in both samples of the listed market only exhibited a time trend over the one-year study
period. The difference of differences shown in the last column of Table 15 indicates that, in both
markets, the short-selling constraints of the pilot and control stocks are similar before and after
the pilot program, after eliminating the market condition changes over the one-year study period.
This result clearly suggests that price tests are not effective measures in posing constraints on
short sales. Several reasons can be attributed to this observation. (1) The price restrictions are
applied to some markets but not in others, so while trading the same stocks, traders can avoid the
price restrictions by choosing a venue where the restrictions are not applied. For example,
because not all markets that trade NASDAQ stocks apply the bid test, short-sellers can route
their orders to avoid the price restriction (Reg. SHO Pilot Report, 2007). This factor may
explain our result that the short interest ratio is negatively impacted by the removal of price tests
in both markets. In the NASDAQ market, the short interest of the control stocks increased by
0.53% relative to the pilot stocks (at a significance level of 1%), suggesting that some shortsellers are routing orders to avoid the bid test. A similar negative impact on the short interest is
also observed for the NYSE & AMEX markets from the results of the difference in differences.
(2) Investors can still sell short after the restricted trading time for control stocks or by
converting to limit orders.
In addition, the short interests for the pilot sample in the NASDAQ market, and for the
control samples in both markets, increased over the pilot period. This increase in short sales over
the one-year period could be a combination of the market conditions and an increase of public
awareness through the media.
As a whole, because price restrictions were not effective in controlling short sales, there
is no regulation benefits associated with them, but only regulation burdens. Therefore, our study
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conditionally supports the SEC’s decision to abolish the tick and bid rules. However, several
papers, such as Bai (2007) and Shkilko et al. (2008) have mentioned that, even if the price tests
are not effective under normal market conditions, they may be meaningful under abnormal
market conditions (such as the market plunge in the subprime crisis) to prevent predatory
shorting.

VIII. Conclusions
The evidence presented in our study suggests that short-selling constraints play a very
important role in explaining the source of momentum abnormal returns, which directly
challenges the efficiency market hypothesis. We argue that the predictable return from the loser
portfolio, which is also the major contributor of the momentum abnormal returns, arises from the
short-selling constraints. After constructing a new proxy for short-selling constraints, we found
that, consistent with the above argument, stocks that are mostly short-selling constrained
generate the lowest returns, even after controlling for the other stock characteristics that are
traditionally believed to determine stock returns, such as the market-to-book ratio, turnover ratio,
past return volatility, analyst forecast dispersion, call (put) open interest, and firm size. This
return prediction in the momentum strategy supports the mispricing explanation that stocks with
more severe short-selling constraints prevent pessimistic information from being quickly
released into the stock price, causing those stocks to be overpriced. These results also support
Miller’s (1977) hypothesis that stocks are overpriced in the presence of short-selling constraints
and heterogeneous beliefs.

112

The short-selling constraints also explain the momentum abnormal returns from the loser
portfolio strongly and independently. When added into the Fama-French three-factor model,
which is well known as one of the best models for explaining cross-sectional stock returns, our
modified four-factor model still significantly improved the explanatory power of the three-factor
model in the loser portfolio and in the total momentum return portfolio. Therefore, the shortselling constraint is a risk factor that predominantly affects the loser portfolio and captures
additional risk loading that the well-established Fama-French three-factor model does not detect.
Our study also explained the long-observed puzzle in the momentum literature that when
NASDAQ stocks are included in the momentum strategy, the momentum abnormal returns
reduce drastically. We found that the short-selling constraints were the key reason to explain this
well-known puzzle. NASDAQ stocks are less severely short-selling constrained relative to
stocks in the NYSE & AMEX markets. Therefore, NASDAQ stocks have less of an overpricing
problem and generate higher returns in the momentum loser portfolio.
Using the new proxy for short-selling constraints, we also provided more supporting
evidence to abolish the price tests in both markets under normal market conditions because they
are not effective in controlling short sales. However, the necessity of price tests in an abnormal
market, such as a market crisis, should be further explored.
We also derived interesting inferences about the determinants of short-selling demand.
We found that short sales are constraint signs. Investors tend to short when the current or past
return indicators are high. At the same time, investors are rational and informed traders in short
sales. They tend to sell short more when there is less risk and less valuation controversy present
in the market. Option market serves as a complement to, rather than a substitution for, short
sales.

113

LIST OF REFERENCES

114

Ali, A. and M. A. Trombley (2006). Short-Selling Costs and Momentum in Stock Returns.
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 33, pp. 587-615.
Almazan, A., K.C. Brown, M. Carlson, and D.A. Chapman (1999). Why Constrain Your
Mutual Fund manager? Unpublished working paper, University of Texas.
Ang, A., R. J. Hodrick, Y. Xing and X. Zhang (2006). The Cross-Section of Volatility
and Expected Returns. Journal of Finance, Vol. 61, pp. 259-299.
Asquith, P. and L. Meulbroek (1995). An Empirical Investigation of Short Interest.
Working paper, Harvard Business School.
Asquith, P, P. Pathak and J. Ritter (2005). Short Interest, Institutional Ownership, and
Stock Returns. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 78, pp. 243-76.
Bai, L. (2007). The Uptick Rule of Short Sale Regulation-Can It Alleviate Downward
Price Pressures from Negative Earnings Shocks? (Available at
http://works.bepress.com/lynn_bai/1).
Barberis, N. and A. Shleifer (2003). Style Investing. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.
68, pp. 161-99.
Brown, S. J. and J. B. Warner (1985). Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies.
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 3-31.
Boni, L. and K. L. Womack (2006). Analysts, Industries, and Price Momentum. Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 41, pp. 85-109.
Boehme, R, B. Danielsen and S. Sorescu (2006). Short-sale Constraints, Dispersion of
Opinion and Overvaluation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 41,
pp. 455–487.
Brennan. M., T. Chordia and A. Subrahmanyam (1998). Alternative Factor Specifications,
Security Characteristics, and the Cross-section of Expected Stock Returns. Journal of
Financial Economics, Vol. 49, pp. 345-373
Carhart, M. (1997). On the Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance. Journal of Finance,
Vol. 52, pp. 57-82.
Chen, J., H. Hong and J. Stein (2002). Breadth of Ownership and Stock Returns. Journal
of Financial Economics, Vol. 66, pp. 171-205.
Cohen, L., K. B., Diether and C., Malloy (2007). Supply and Demand Shifts in the
Shorting Market. Journal of Finance, Vol. 62, pp. 2061-96.

115

Danielsen, B. and S. Sorescu (2001). Why Do Option Introductions Depress Stock Prices?
A Study of Diminishing Short Sale Constraints. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 36, pp. 451-84.
Datar, V., N. Naik and R. Radcliffe (1998). Liquidity and Asset Returns: An Alternative
Test, Journal of Financial Markets, Vol. 1, pp.203-220.
D’ Avolio, G. (2002). The Market for Borrowing Stock. Journal of Financial Economics,
Vol. 66, pp.271-306.
Dechow, P., A. Hutton, L. Meulbroek and R. Sloan (2001). Short-Sellers, Fundamental
Analysis, and Stock Returns. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 61, pp. 77-106.
Diether, K. B., K. B., Malloy and A. Scherbina (2002). Differences of Opinion and the
Cross-Section of Stock Returns. Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, pp. 2113-2141.
Diether, K. B., K. Lee and I. M. Werner (2008). “Short-Sale Strategies and Return
Predictability,” Forthcoming in Review of Financial Studies.
Fama, E. and K. French (1993). Common Risk Factors in Returns on Stocks and Bonds.
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 33, pp. 3-56.
Figlewski, S. (1981). GNMA Pass-Through Securities, Futures Trading and Volatility in
the GNMA Market. Journal of Finance, Vol. 36, pp. 445-56.
Figlewski, S. and G. P. Webb (1993). Options, Short Sales, and Market Completeness.
Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, pp. 761-77.
Gompers, P. A. and A. Metrick (2001). Institutional Investors and Equity Prices.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 166, pp. 229-260.
Hong, H. and J. C. Stein (1999). A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading
and Over-reaction in Asset Markets. Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, pp. 2143-84.
Hong, H., T. Lim and J. Stein (2000). Bad News Travels Slowly: Size, Analyst Coverage,
and the Profitability of Momentum Strategies. Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, pp. 26595.
Jegadeesh, N. and S. Titman (1993). Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers:
Implications for Stock Market Efficiency. Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, pp. 65-91.
Jones, C. M. and O, Lamont (2002). Short-Sale Constraints and Stock Returns. Journal
of Financial Economics, Vol. 66, pp. 207-239.
Korajczyk, R. and R. Sadka (2004). Are Momentum Profits Robust to Trading Costs?

116

Journal of Finance, Vol. 59, pp. 1039-82.
Kiefer. N. and T. Vogelsang (2002). Heteroskedasticity-Autocorrelation Robust Standard
Errors Using the Bartlett Kernel without Truncation. Econometrica, Vol.70, pp.
2093-2095.
Lee, C. M. C. and B. Swaminathan (2000). Price Momentum and Trading Volume.
Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, pp.2017-69.
Lesmond, D. A., M. J. Schill, and C. Zhou (2004). The Illusory Nature of Momentum
Profits. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 71, pp. 349-80.
Lewellen, J. (2002). Momentum and Autocorrelation in Stock Returns. The Review of
Financial Studies, Vol. 15, pp. 533-564.
Nagel, S. (2005). Short Sales, Institutional Investors and the Cross-Section of Stock
Returns. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 78, pp. 277-309.
Miller, E. (1977). Risk, Uncertainty and Divergence of Opinion. Journal of Finance, Vol.
32, pp. 1151-68.
Ofek, E., M. P. Richardson and R. F Whitelaw (2004). Limited Arbitrage and Short Sales
Restrictions: Evidence from the Options Markets. Journal of Financial Economics,
Vol. 74, pp. 305-342.
Office of Economic Analysis, SEC (2007). Economic Analysis of the Short Sale Price
Restrictions Under the Regulation SHO Pilot. (Available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2007/regshopilot020607.pdf)

Sadka, R. (2006). Momentum and Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift Anomalies: The
Role of Liquidity Risk. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 80, pp. 309-49.
Sadka, R. and A. Scherbina (2007). Analyst Disagreement, Mispricing, and Liquidity.
Journal of Finance, Vol. 62, pp. 2367-2403.
Shkilko, A., B. Van Ness and R. Van Ness (2008). Aggressive Short-selling and Price
Reversals. Working paper.
Sorescu, S. M. (2000). The Effect of Options on Stock Prices: 1973-1995. Journal of
Finance, Vol. 55, pp. 487-514.
Stata Reference Book (2009). Longitudinal Data/Panel Data, the Stata Press, pp. 506
Wooldridge, J. (2001). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, the MIT
Press, pp. 331.

117

Woolridge, J. R. and A. Dickinson (1994). Short Selling and Common Stock Prices.
Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 50, pp. 20-28.

118

Short Interest & Institutional Ownership
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Figure 1. SIR and IOS
Line plots of the median SIR, IOS and the 95th percentile SIR
SIR (short interest ratio) is the monthly short interest ratio, calculated as the number of shares
shorted divided by the monthly outstanding shares. IOS (institutional ownership ratio) is the
monthly ratio of institutional ownership with stock splits for late filing adjusted, scaled by shares
outstanding. The sample period runs from January 1988 to December 2005.
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Figure 2. Short-selling Constraints
Line plots of median short interest ratio (SIR), institutional ownership (IOS), predicted realizable
shorting demand (SID), and the short selling constraints (SC). SIR is the monthly short interest
ratio, calculated as the number of shares shorted divided by the monthly outstanding shares. IOS
is the monthly ratio of institutional ownership with stock splits for late filling adjusted scaled by
shares outstanding. SID is the predicted realizable shorting demand estimated from the pooled
interval regression. SC is calculated as the difference between the realizable shorting demand
(SID) and the short interest ratio (SIR). The sample period runs from January 1988 to December
2005.
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Table 5. Summary Statistics
Summary statistics of short interest ratio, institutional ownership ratio and firm characteristics
Panel A reports the monthly time-series averages of equally-weighted cross-sectional means and standard deviations of the variables
used in the analysis. MB is market to book ratio; ADISP (analyst forecast dispersion) is the standard deviation of analysts’ EPS
forecasts in I/B/E/S, scaled by the absolute means of forecasts; TURN (turnover) is the monthly trading volume scaled by shares
outstanding and divided by two for Nasdaq stocks; IOS (institutional ownership ratio) is the monthly ratio of institutional ownership
with stock splits for late filling adjusted scaled by shares outstanding; VOL (volatility) is the standard deviation of monthly individual
stock returns for the past 12 months; logSZ is the monthly natural log of market capitalization. CALL (PUT) is the total call (put)
option contracts for a particular stock scaled by thousands of shares outstanding. LIQ is the yearly Sadka permanent variable liquidity
factor. SIR is the monthly short interest ratio, calculated as the number of shares shorted divided by the monthly outstanding shares.
Panel B reports monthly time-series averages of cross-sectional correlations 17 . The sample period runs from January 1988 to
December 2005.
LIQ
MB
ADSIP VOL TURN RET logSZ CALL PUT
SIR
IOS
Panel A: means & standard deviations
Mean
0.0006 5.3154
0.1668 0.1489 0.0741 0.0179 19.0324 0.1311 0.0813 0.0289 0.3650
Median
0.0008 2.0513
0.0364 0.1191 0.0422 0.0039 18.8862 0.0482 0.0218 0.0059 0.3212
Standard Deviation
0.0037 103.8564 0.9648 0.1183 0.1895 0.1919 2.0707 0.3223 0.2484 0.1583 0.2810
Firms per month (average)
3414
2912
1996
3419
3437
3423
3423
1297
1284
3446
3437
Panel B: cross-sectional correlations
MB
ADSIP
VOL
TURN
RET
logSZ
CALL
PUT
SIR
17

-0.0051

0.0982 0.1050 0.0249 0.0678 0.0909
0.1039 0.0076 -0.0118 -0.0975 0.0149
0.2267 0.0772 -0.3098 0.1919
0.0944 0.1987 0.4454
0.0446 0.0192
0.0783

LIQ is not included in Panel B, because it is the same for all the stocks in the market for a given year.
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0.0864
0.0128
0.1236
0.4055
0.0241
0.1251
0.8367

0.0406
-0.0006
0.0327
0.2103
0.0085
0.1263
0.5697
0.5487

0.0166
-0.0592
-0.2209
0.2455
0.0041
0.6625
0.0000
0.0361
0.1746

Table 6. Summary Statistics of SIR and IOS
Summary statistics of short interest ratio, institutional ownership ratio and firm characteristics
for two groups: SIR IOS and SIR> IOS. SIR (short interest ratio) is the monthly short interest
ratio, calculated as the number of shares shorted divided by the monthly outstanding shares. IOS
(institutional ownership ratio) is the monthly ratio of institutional ownership with stock splits for
late filing adjusted, scaled by shares outstanding. T-statistics for two-sample t-tests are reported
in the parentheses. The sample period runs from January 1988 to December 2005. Significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by a, b and c, respectively.
SIR IOS
SIR> IOS
Median
Mean
Median
Mean
(t-statistics)
SIR
0.0060
0.0229
0.0059
0.1462
(-32.8842)a
IOS
0.3468
0.3836
0
0.0496
(393.1767)a
MB
2.0535
5.2467
2.1857
7.6906
(-4.7686)a
ADSIP
0.0360
0.1653
0.0606
0.2586
(-6.9707)a
VOL
0.1169
0.1454
0.1673
0.2120
(-60.6771)a
TURN
0.0428
0.0729
0.0342
0.1011
(-7.6866)a
RET
0.0044
0.0176
0
0.0234
(-3.4707)a
LogSZ
18.9869
19.1389
16.9501
17.2062
(179.2491)a
CALL
0.0477
0.1229
0.1242
0.6373
(-16.7423)a
PUT
0.0216
0.0763
0.0572
0.3850
(-14.1564)a
LIQ
0.0009
0.0006
0.0004
0.0002
(17.3144)a
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Table 7. Pooled Interval Regression
Pooled interval regression analysis is run to estimate the latent shorting demand from January
1988 to December 2005. Dependent variable (SID) is the monthly realizable shorting demand,
which always fall within the interval with the realized short interest ratio as the lower bound and
institutional ownership as a conservative upper bound. Explanatory variables are VOL, RET,
lagRET, TURN, lagTURN, CALL, PUT, LIQ, logSZ, logSZSQ, MB and ADISP as defined in
Table I. The table reports the coefficient estimates with cluster robust error adjusted t-statistics.
Variables
Coefficients
Robust Std. Err.
Z
P>|Z|
RET
0.0137
0.0035
3.91
0.0000
lagRET
0.0144
0.0036
4.04
0.0000
MB
-0.00002
5.57e-06
-3.39
0.0000
logSZ
0.2126
0.0206
10.30
0.0000
logSZSQ
-0.0049
0.0005
-10.35
0.0000
TURN
0.1360
0.0187
7.27
0.0000
lagTURN
0.0938
0.0148
6.34
0.0000
ADSIP
-0.0025
0.0007
-3.34
0.0001
VOL
-0.1743
0.0214
-8.13
0.0000
CALL
0.0463
0.0170
2.73
0.0060
PUT
0.0670
0.0170
3.95
0.0000
LIQ
0.5752
0.1588
3.62
0.0000
_CONS
-2.0932
0.2241
-9.34
0.0000
Lnsigma
-2.5400
0.0348
-72.91
0.0000
Sigma
0.0789
0.0027
Observation summary:
1,787 (1.323%) left-censored observations
129212 (95.64%) uncensored observations
4,117 (3.047%) right-censored observations
135116
interval observations
Measures of Fit for intreg of SIR, IOS
Log-Lik Intercept Only: -26515.249
Log-Lik Full Model:
-20263.578
Prob > LR:
0.000
McFadden's R2:
0.236
McFadden's Adj R2:
0.235
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Table 8. Double Sorting
Monthly cross-sectional returns based on the double sorting of short-selling constraints (SC),
conditional on market-to-book ratio (MB), size (logSZ), past 12 month’s return volatility (VOL),
analyst forecast dispersion (ADISP), turnover (TURN), call open interest (CALL), and put open
interest (PUT)18. At the end of each month t from January 1988 to December 2005, stocks are
ranked by the past 6 month’s mean market-to-book ratio (Panel B), mean size (Panel C), mean
past 12 month’s return volatility (Panel D), mean analyst forecast dispersion (Panel E), mean
turnover (Panel F), mean call open interest (Panel G), and mean put open interest (Panel H).
Later the portfolios are further intersected by the independent sorting on the past 6 month’s mean
short-selling constraints. All the sortings are in 3 groups. Stocks are held in these portfolios for
6 months, i.e., one-sixth of each portfolio is rebalanced each month. The table presents equallyweighted returns on these portfolios with heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-consistent t-statistics
shown in parentheses following Kiefer and Bogelsang (2002). Returns are reported in decimal
points per month. Significance at the 5% and 10% level is indicated by a and b, respectively.
Panel A presents time-series averages of cross-sectional means and medians of short-selling
constraints.
Short-selling Constraints (SC)
(High)
(Low)
SC3-SC1
(t-statistics)
SC1
SC2
SC3
Panel A: firm characteristics by short-selling constraints groups
Mean SC (percent) 0.2329
0.1972
0.1281
Median SC (percent) 0.2260
0.1982
0.1438
Panel B: double sorting on market-to-book (MB)
P1
(High)
0.0037
0.0046
0.0123
P2
0.0094
0.0101
0.0179
P3
(Low)
0.0129
0.0164
0.0188
P3-P1
Raw
0.0092
0.0118
0.0065
(t-statistics)
(1.9862)
(2.4281)
(2.8464)

0.0086
0.0085
0.0059
0.0027

(3.3266)
(3.2480)
(5.2035)a
(-0.1236)

Panel C: double sorting on size (logSZ)
P1
(High)
0.0086
0.0104
P2
0.0089
0.0078
P3
(Low)
0.0115
0.0140
P3-P1
Raw
0.0029
0.0036
(t-statistics)
(0.6638)
(0.5632)

0.0061
0.0069
0.0033
-0.0028

(2.0475)
(3.1632)
(1.3880)
(0.0270)

Panel D: double sorting on past 12 months’ return volatility (VOL)
P1
(High)
0.0037
0.0096
0.0142
0.0117
P2
0.0102
0.0104
0.0164
0.0065
P3
(Low)
0.0102
0.0118
0.0165
0.0064

(5.3947)a
(3.6303)
(3.1211)

0.0147
0.0158
0.0148
0.0001
(0.8008)

18

LIQ is the market liquid risk and does not vary across firms. Therefore, double sorting based on LIQ and
shortcons is not necessary.
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Table 8. (continued)
Short-selling Constraints (SC)
(High)
(Low)
SC1
SC2
SC3
0.0065
0.0022
0.0023
(1.9372)
(1.5289)
(-0.1441)

SC3-SC1

(t-statistics)

0.0042

(4.3199)b

Panel E: double sorting on analyst forecast dispersion (ADISP)
P1
(High)
0.0097
0.0119
0.0160
P2
0.0083
0.0089
0.0134
P3
(Low)
0.0087
0.0109
0.0156
P3-P1
Raw
-0.0010
-0.0010
-0.0004
(t-statistics)
(-0.7214)
(0.6081)
(-1.5217)

0.0063
0.0051
0.0069
-0.0006

(2.4776)
(3.6919)
(4.4186)b
(1.2695)

Panel F: double sorting on turnover (TURN)
P1
(High)
0.0060
0.0064
P2
0.0099
0.0119
P3
(Low)
0.0108
0.0121
P3-P1
Raw
0.0048
0.0057
(t-statistics)
(1.9286)
(2.7553)

0.0114
0.0041
0.0059
-0.0054

(4.0174)b
(2.3745)
(3.9604)b
(1.5371)

Panel G: double sorting on call open interest (CALL)
P1
(High)
0.0096
0.0107
0.0170
P2
0.0077
0.0100
0.0111
P3
(Low)
0.0092
0.0111
0.0138
P3-P1
Raw
-0.0004
0.0004
-0.0032
(t-statistics)
(-0.3591)
(-0.6187)
(-1.7219)

0.0074
0.0034
0.0046
-0.0028

(3.2170)
(3.9165)b
(2.4829)
(1.8872)

Panel H: double sorting on put open interest (PUT)
P1
(High)
0.0095
0.0099
0.0152
P2
0.0079
0.0096
0.0149
P3
(Low)
0.0091
0.0119
0.0158
P3-P1
Raw
-0.0004
0.0020
0.0006
(t-statistics)
(-0.4096)
(0.0443)
(-0.6941)

0.0057
0.0070
0.0067
0.0010

(2.7121)
(4.3777)b
(3.1467)
(0.5285)

P3-P1
Raw
(t-statistics)

0.0174
0.0144
0.0153
-0.0021
(0.3855)
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Table 9. Double Sorting of SC and RET
Monthly returns to momentum strategy based on the double sorting of short-selling constraints
(SC), conditional on past 6 months’ returns, and single sorting based on the short-selling
constraints. At the end of each month t from January 1988 to December 2005, stocks are single
ranked by the past 6 month’s mean short-selling constraints in Panel A. In Panel B, the
portfolios are first sorted on the past 6 month’s geometric returns, and then are further intersected
by the independent sorting on the past 6 month’s mean short-selling constraints. All the sortings
are in 3 groups. Stocks are held in these portfolios for 6 months, i.e., one-sixth of each portfolio
is rebalanced each month. The table presents equally-weighted returns on these portfolios with
heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-consistent t-statistics shown in parentheses following Kiefer
and Bogelsang (2002). Returns are reported in decimal points per month. Significance at the 5%
and 10% level is indicated by a and b, respectively.
Short-selling Constraints (SC)
(High)
(Low)
SC3-SC1
(t-statistics)
SC1
SC2
SC3
Panel A: single sorting on short selling constraints (SC)
0.0082
0.0118
0.0140
0.0058
(2.3707)
Panel B: double sorting on past 6 months’ returns (RET)
P1
(High)
0.0095
0.0098
0.0188
P2
0.0086
0.0096
0.0142
P3
(Low)
0.0077
0.0120
0.0132
P3-P1
Raw
-0.0087
-0.0022
-0.0056
(t-statistics)
(-0.7888)
(0.1262)
(-0.8863)
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0.0093
0.0056
0.0055
0.0031

(3.3805)
(2.9428)
(2.4810)
(0.8369)

Table 10. Factor Models
OLS regressions are run from January 1988 to December 2005 to test the relationship between
momentum returns and a measure of short-selling constraints (SC). Dependent variable is the
average monthly returns of the portfolios from the momentum strategy in excess of risk free rate.
P0 represent the returns from the winner portfolio, P2 represent the returns from the loser
portfolio, P0-P2 represents the return differences between the winner and loser portfolios. Panel
A shows the coefficient estimates of Fama-French three factor regression:
=
∗
∗
∗
. is the monthly average portfolio returns;
is the
monthly Treasury bill rate (i.e. risk-free interest rate),
(MKTRF) is the monthly FamaFrench excess return on the market, SMB is the monthly Fama-French small firm factor, HML is
the monthly Fama-French book-to-market (value) factor. Panel B shows the coefficient
estimates of the four factor model with three Fama-French factors and the short-selling
constraints, SC. Panel C shows the coefficient estimates of Carhart four factor model, with three
Fama-French factors and momentum factor, MM. Panel D shows the coefficient estimates of the
five factor model with three Fama-French factors, momentum factor and the short-selling
constraints, SC. The table reports t-statistics, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
by using Kiefer and Bogelsang (2002) approach. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is
indicated by a, b and c, respectively.
P0 (winners)
P1
P2 (losers)
P0-P2
Panel A: Fama-French three factor regressions without short-selling constraints (SC)
Intercept
0.0018
-0.0020
-0.0020
0.0007
(t-statistics)
(1.4410)
(-1.6855)
(-0.5995)
(0.2228)
SMB
0.6340
0.2610
0.4510
0.1880
a
a
b
(t-statistics)
(20.2499)
(7.2783)
(5.0186)
(1.6695)
HML
0.1320
0.5250
0.2150
-0.0811
a
(1.9636)
(-0.5361)
(t-statistics)
(2.5964)
(8.6911)
MKTRF
1.0870
1.1550
1.5850
-0.4970
a
a
a
(t-statistics)
(94.9521)
(48.1666)
(18.1756)
(-5.2435)b
Adj. R2
91.86%
88.47%
69.41%
10.05%
Panel B: Fama-French three factor regressions with short-selling constraints (SC) added
Intercept
0.0028
-0.0030
-0.0096
0.0093
(t-statistics)
(1.7719)
(-2.7022)
(-2.3215)
(2.0388)
SMB
0.7010
0.2010
-0.0489
0.7600
a
c
(t-statistics)
(14.2195)
(3.8067)
(-0.3240)
(3.8313)
HML
0.0806
0.5710
0.5930
-0.5130
a
b
(5.3211)
(-3.3698)
(t-statistics)
(1.7257)
(10.3678)
MKTRF
1.1180
1.1270
1.3550
-0.2350
a
a
a
(t-statistics)
(83.2145)
(28.8600)
(28.7634)
(-4.4497)c
SC
-0.1350
0.1210
0.9980
-1.1420
a
(t-statistics)
(-3.5589)
(3.0814)
(8.5200)
(-7.5398)a
Adj. R2
92.11%
88.76%
77.42%
31.78%
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Table 10. (continued)
P0 (winners)
P1
P2 (losers)
P0-P2
Panel C: Carhart four factor regressions without short-selling constraints (SC)
Intercept
-0.0005
0.0004
0.0081
-0.0116
(t-statistics)
(-0.4930)
(0.5662)
(3.4458)
(-6.6942)a
SMB
0.5910
0.3080
0.6340
-0.0457
a
a
a
(t-statistics)
(36.8353)
(17.4922)
(16.9791)
(-1.4668)
HML
0.1700
0.4830
0.0400
-0.1330
b
a
(11.6113)
(0.9362)
(4.6337)c
(t-statistics)
(5.8281)
MKTRF
1.1660
1.0680
1.2290
-0.0634
a
a
a
(t-statistics)
(86.2341)
(32.7398)
(47.3100)
(-2.4275)
MM
0.1800
-0.1990
-0.8150
0.9930
(t-statistics)
(21.4435)a
(-14.3461)a
(-28.7897)a
(36.7326)a
94.33%
93.03%
93.63%
84.90%
Adj. R2
Panel D: Carhart four factor regressions with short-selling constraints (SC) added
Intercept
-0.0010
0.0014
0.0054
-0.0093
(t-statistics)
(-0.9330)
(1.3775)
(2.3616)
(-5.8003)b
SMB
0.5640
0.3580
0.4950
0.0817
a
a
a
(t-statistics)
(36.7031)
(15.6151)
(13.5834)
(1.7953)
HML
0.1920
0.4440
0.1540
0.0344
(12.3264)a
(3.4477)
(0.9792)
(t-statistics)
(7.5886)a
MKTRF
1.1590
1.1080
1.1930
-0.0324
(t-statistics)
(83.6023)a
(32.9764)a
(43.3351)a
(-1.0367)
MM
0.1910
-0.2180
-0.7560
0.9430
(t-statistics)
(18.3560)a
(-13.0905)a
(-17.4548)a
(24.7925)a
SC
-0.0504
0.0903
-0.2670
0.2310
(t-statistics)
(-2.1825)
(2.8571)
(-4.5796)c
(4.0658)c
Adj. R2
94.31%
93.14%
94.05%
85.50%
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Table 11. Short-squeeze Risk & Factor Models
OLS regressions are run from January 1988 to December 2005 to test the relationship between
momentum returns and a measure of short-squeeze risk (SS). Short-squeeze risk is defined as
SIR/ (IOS- SIR), where SIR is the short interest ratio, IOS is the institutional ownership scaled
by the total number of shares outstanding. Dependent variable is the average monthly returns of
the portfolios from the momentum strategy in excess of risk free rate. P0 represent the returns
from the winner portfolio, P2 represent the returns from the loser portfolio, P0-P2 represents the
return differences between the winner and loser portfolios. Panel A shows the coefficient
estimates of Fama-French three factor regression:
=
∗
∗
∗
. is the monthly average portfolio returns;
is the monthly Treasury bill rate (i.e.
risk-free interest rate),
(MKTRF) is the monthly Fama-French excess return on the
market, SMB is the monthly Fama-French small firm factor, HML is the monthly Fama-French
book-to-market (value) factor. Panel B shows the coefficient estimates of the four factor model
with three Fama-French factors and the short-squeeze risk, SS. Panel C shows the coefficient
estimates of the Carhart four factor model, with three Fama-French factors and the momentum
factor, MM. Panel D shows the coefficient estimates of the five factor model with three FamaFrench factors, the momentum factor and the short-squeeze risk, SS. The table reports t-statistics,
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by using Kiefer and Bogelsang (2002)
approach. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by a, b and c, respectively.
P0 (winners)
P1
P2 (losers)
P0-P2
Panel A: Fama-French three factor regressions without short-squeeze risk (SS)
Intercept
0.0063
0.0031
0.0016
0.0015
(4.9211)b
(1.0860)
(2.0579)
(t-statistics)
(8.1594)a
SMB
0.8900
0.5230
0.8370
0.0575
(12.7320)a
(6.2838)a
(0.4929)
(t-statistics)
(38.9594)a
HML
0.1690
0.4470
0.1890
-0.0160
(t-statistics)
(7.0122)a
(14.8594)a
(1.6197)
(-0.1345)
MKTRF
0.9890
0.9040
1.2770
-0.2890
(t-statistics)
(43.0277)a
(50.2886)a
(18.0431)a
(-3.1690)
92.46%
89.16%
67.00%
3.75%
Adj. R2
Panel B: Fama-French three factor regressions with short-squeeze risk (SS) added
Intercept
0.0041
0.0021
-0.0011
-0.0019
(t-statistics)
(6.6934)a
(3.6094)
(-0.6815)
(1.5777)
SMB
0.8380
0.5000
0.7750
0.0667
(13.2005)a
(6.3866)a
(0.6279)
(t-statistics)
(39.7988)a
HML
0.1100
0.4200
0.1170
-0.0053
(t-statistics)
(4.4289)c
(12.0089)a
(1.3078)
(-0.0503)
MKTRF
1.1250
0.9660
1.4420
-0.3130
(t-statistics)
(63.5394)a
(53.6645)a
(20.0027)a
(-5.3927)b
SS
-0.3230
-0.1480
-0.3900
0.0577
(t-statistics)
(-6.3342)a
(-12.9815)a
(-4.9748)b
(0.4718)
92.55%
89.27%
74.33%
24.93%
Adj. R2
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Table 11. (continued)
P0 (winners)
P1
P2 (losers)
Panel C: Carhart four factor regressions without short-squeeze risk (SS)
Intercept
0.0046
0.0048
0.0095
a
a
(t-statistics)
(7.6497)
(9.8513)
(5.1670)b
SMB
0.8610
0.5520
0.9700
a
a
(t-statistics)
(24.5103)
(19.5653)
(12.9767)a
HML
0.1970
0.4200
0.0613
a
a
(23.6317)
(0.5402)
(t-statistics)
(13.2577)
MKTRF
1.0410
0.8520
1.0380
a
a
(t-statistics)
(87.8889)
(31.3061)
(28.1192)a
MM
0.1570
-0.1590
-0.7260
(t-statistics)
(8.5183)a
(-12.1124)a
(-17.8082)a
94.19%
92.68%
87.40%
Adj. R2
Panel D: Carhart four factor regressions with short-squeeze risk (SS) added
Intercept
0.0029
0.0036
0.0057
a
a
(t-statistics)
(6.1466)
(7.4953)
(3.4344)
SMB
0.8190
0.5230
0.8800
a
a
(t-statistics)
(27.1451)
(21.2463)
(12.9215)a
HML
0.1420
0.3810
-0.0583
(14.7557)a
(-0.7152)
(t-statistics)
(7.2207)a
MKTRF
1.1540
-0.9300
1.2820
(t-statistics)
(37.7151)a
(44.7557)a
(50.5027)a
MM
0.1400
-0.1710
-0.7640
(t-statistics)
(9.3347)a
(-14.5641)a
(-16.7345)a
SS
-0.2830
0.1970
-0.6090
(t-statistics)
(-7.0444)a
(-13.9530)a
(-9.7758)a
Adj. R2
94.20%
92.80%
88.28%
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P0-P2
-0.0081
(-6.0275)a
-0.1040
(-2.3850)
0.1390
(1.2893)
0.0017
(-0.0389)
0.8820
(15.6383)a
74.91%
-0.0062
(-4.9807)b
-0.0571
(-1.2677)
0.2010
(2.2322)
-0.1250
(-2.7756)
0.9020
(15.2413)a
0.3160
(3.9802)c
76.52%

Table 12. Momentum Returns with and without NASDAQ Stocks
This table reports the monthly returns for momentum portfolios (6,0,6) formed based on past-sixmonth returns and held for six months without skip. P1 (past winners) is the equally-weighted
portfolio of 10% of the stocks with the highest returns during the past six months; P10 (past
losers) is the equally-weighted portfolio of the 10% of the stocks with lowest returns during the
past six months. P0-P10 represents the return difference between the winner and loser portfolios.
Difference represents the different returns between the groups of stocks from all markets and
stocks without NASDAQ market. Panel A shows the returns from the stocks included this study,
and Panel B demonstrates the returns from all the common stocks in the market. Returns are
reported in decimal points per month. The table reports t-statistics, adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by using Kiefer and Bogelsang (2002) approach.
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by a, b and c, respectively.
All Stocks
NYSE+AMEX
Difference
Panel A: Momentum strategy using the data in this study
P0 (winners)
0.0231
0.0226
0.0005
a
a
(t-statistics)
(13.9428)
(17.6230)
(0.4981)
P10 (losers)
0.0226
0.0189
0.0037
a
a
(10.0531)
(1.9567)
(t-statistics)
(8.0942)
P0-P10
0.0005
0.0037
-0.0032
(t-statistics)
(0.2644)
(2.4249)
(-1.8155)
Panel B: Momentum strategy using all the firms in the market
P0 (winners)
0.0185
0.0165
(t-statistics)
(8.5929)a
(10.6465)a
P10 (losers)
0.0153
0.0087
(t-statistics)
(7.3688)a
(4.0737)c
P0-P10
0.0032
0.0078
(6.0823)b
(t-statistics)
(1.6989)
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0.0020
(2.1771)
0.0066
(6.2740)a
-0.0046
(-3.7276)

Table 13. NASDAQ Effect
T tests with unequal variances on short interest ratio (SIR) and short-selling constraints (SC) are
run between NASDAQ and NYSE & AMEX stocks in Panel A. Panel B runs a linear regression
of SC on the indicator variable NASDAQ with heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors.
NASDAQ is a binary variable, which takes on value 1 when the stock is listed in NASDAQ and
0 when it is listed on NYSE & AMEX. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by a, b and c, respectively.
SIR
SC
Panel A: T test with unequal variances
NASDAQ
0.0197
0.1648
NYSE & AMEX
0.0285
0.2022
Difference
-0.0088
-0.0378
(t-statistics)
(-65.88)a
(-129.98)a
Panel B: Regression with robust standard error
Constants
0.2022
(t-statistics)
(1273.55)a
NASDAQ
-0.0374
(t-statistics)
(-129.98)a
R-square
0.1186

Table 14. Summary Statistics of Pilot and Control Sample before the Pilot Program
Summary statistics of the Pilot and Control samples in different markets over the four month
period prior to the start of the Pilot program on May 2, 2005 are reported. Only stocks that exist
both in the pre-pilot and pilot period for at least one month, and in the regression data in Table
IV are included in this analysis. The statistical difference between the Pilot and Control samples
is tested using two-sample t-tests. N is the average number of firms in the samples, TURN is
turnover, SIR is short interest ratio, SC is short-selling constraints, MB is market-to-book ratio.
∆ is the difference of the above variables investigated between Pilot and Control samples. Tstatistics are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by a,
b and c, respectively.
Variable
NYSE & AMEX
NASDAQ
Pilot
Control
∆ (t-statistics) Pilot
Control
∆
(t-statistics)
N
384
376
759
826
TURN 0.1422 0.1435 -0.0013 (-0.21)
0.0996 0.1002 -0.0006
(-0.09)
SIR
0.0423 0.0412 0.0011 (0.34)
0.0523 0.0433
0.0090
(2.74)a
SC
0.2194 0.2189 0.0004 (0.13)
0.1736 0.1802 -0.0065
(-1.58)
MB
3.5226 4.6555 -1.1330 (-1.46)
4.3041 8.9610 -4.6570
(-1.32)
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Table 15. Pilot Program Effect
This table summarizes how stock characteristics change after the tick and bid tests are removed.
Paired t-tests are run separately on pilot and control samples for direct comparisons on monthly
short interest ratio (SIR), short-selling constraints (SC), turnover (TURN), and market-to-book
ratio (MB) before and after the Pilot program which started in May 2, 2005. NYSE & AMEX
and NASDAQ are investigated separately for the potential differences between tick and bid tests
or different trading environment between the two markets. Pre-Pilot is the four-month period
before the starting date of the Pilot program in 2005, Pilot is the eight-month period in 2005 after
the program started. ∆ is the difference of the variables investigated, between the “Pre-Pilot”
and “Pilot” periods within both pilot and control samples. Two-sample t-tests are run on the
difference of the differences between the pilot and control samples. T-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by a, b and c, respectively.
Pilot Sample
Control Sample
Pilot ∆Variable Market
Pre-Pilot Pilot ∆
Pre-Pilot Pilot
∆
Control ∆
SIR
Listed
0.0423 0.0434 0.0011 0.0412 0.0454 0.0043 -0.0032
(t-statistics)
(0.66)
(5.19)a
(-1.72)c
NASDAQ 0.0523 0.0576 0.0052 0.0433 0.0538 0.0105
-0.0053
a
a
(11.16)
(-3.32)a
(t-statistics)
(4.07)
SC
Listed
0.2194 0.2222 0.0028 0.2189 0.2216 0.0027 0.0001
(t-statistics)
(2.13)b
(2.25)b
(0.06)
NASDAQ 0.1730 0.1731 0.0001 0.1796 0.1789 -0.0006
0.0007
(-0.42)
(0.30)
(t-statistics)
(0.06)
TURN Listed
0.1422 0.1417 -0.0005 0.1435 0.1439 0.0004 -0.0009
(t-statistics)
(-0.19)
(0.17)
(-0.26)
NASDAQ 0.0096 0.0981 -0.0015 0.1002 0.0964 -0.0038
0.0023
(t-statistics)
(-0.45)
(-1.47)
(0.54)
MB
Listed
3.5226 3.4468 -0.0758 4.6555 4.0223 -0.6332 -0.5574
(t-statistics)
(-0.29)
(1.77)c
(1.27)
NASDAQ 4.2651 4.8204 0.5554 8.9453 4.9418 -4.0034
-4.5588
(-1.14)
(-1.28)
(t-statistics)
(0.94)
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation studies the sources of abnormal returns from the momentum strategy.
This market anomaly has puzzled researchers in finance for the past two decades.
The first essay decomposes the momentum expected returns from a mathematical model.
The empirical results from the historical data show that own-stock autocovariance is an
important source in generating momentum returns. More interestingly, the own-stock
autocovariance comes primarily from the loser portfolio. Therefore, stock returns are correlated
between two consecutive time periods. The market may not be as efficient as we previously
believed.
Based on the findings of the first essay, the second essay attempts to find the explanation
for the own-stock return autocorrelation, especially from the loser portfolio. The empirical
results indicate that short-selling constraints and risks are the key to this asymmetric
phenomenon. Stocks with more severe short-selling constraints prevent pessimistic information
from being released into the stock prices more quickly; and thus causes those stocks to be
overpriced and auto-correlated in their returns.
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